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RECENT LABOR LAW DECISIONS OF
THE SUPREME COURT
TERRY A. BETHEL*
Introduction
This Article highlights the more notable labor and employment
law decisions by the Supreme Court since the beginning of 1984.'
Although the Court worked no major changes,2 it has been "tinker-
ing and tailoring,"3 deferring to administrative interpretation or re-
fining its own analysis from previous opinions. Even so, the Court
has acted in important areas, and its decisions raise significant
questions.
I. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT CASES
A. Constructive Concerted Activity
The Supreme Court's most significant interpretation of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act4 (NLRA) in either of the last two terms is
NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc. ,' in which it endorsed the NLRB's
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington. B.A. 1968, J.D.
summa cum laude 1971, Ohio State University. An abbreviated version of this paper
was presented to the Labor and Employment Law Institute in Louisville, Kentucky on
May 1, 1985.
1. For a complete listing of the decisions issued during the 1983-84 term, see Har-
din, Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1983-84 Term, 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No.
31, at 301 (1984).
2. There has been one major reversal in the 1984-85 term. In Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985) the Court overruled
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) and announced that public em-
ployers are subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219.
Although the case is obviously of great importance to public employers, the decision
turned on issues of federalism and involved no significant interpretation of the FLSA
itself.
3. See Player, Employment Discrimination: The 1983 Term of the Supreme Court, "Tinkering
and Tailoring," Reference Manual, 1984 Midwest Labor Law Conference (Ohio Legal
Center Institute) 2.01.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-159 (1982).
5. 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984). For a more thorough review of the issues raised by City
Disposal, see Bethel, Constructive Concerted Activity Under the NLRA: Conflicting Signals from
the Court and the Board, 59 IND. L.J. 583 (1984). See also, Gorman & Finkin, The Individual
and the Requirement of "Concert" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
286 (1981) (traces pre-City Disposal NLRB and court decisions concerning protection for
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so-called Interboro doctrine.6 In City Disposal, an employee (Brown)
was discharged for refusing to drive a garbage truck. Because
Brown believed that the truck had defective brakes, he claimed that
his refusal was justified by a clause in the collective bargaining
agreement providing that employees could not be discharged for
refusing to operate unsafe equipment "unless such refusal is unjus-
tified."-7 The Board adopted the finding of its administrative law
judge (ALJ) that the discharge violated section 8(a)(1). 8 Even
though an employee acting alone would not appear to be engaged
in "concerted activity" for purposes of section 7,' the Interboro doc-
trine, invoked by the ALJ in City Disposal, created the fiction of con-
structive concerted activity for employees who seek to invoke
collectively bargained rights. As the Court noted in City Disposal, the
Board's Interboro decisions have been supported by two rationales:
First, the claim of a collectively bargained right is merely an exten-
sion of the concerted activity that created the right; second, an em-
ployee's invocation of contractual rights protects, and therefore is in
the interest of, other employees in the bargaining unit.'"
In City Disposal, the Court, speaking through Justice Brennan,
accepted both theories, although it placed primary emphasis on the
extension of concerted activity rationale. The Court said that the
Act does not require a literal definition of concerted activity, even
individual complaints above wages, hours, and working conditions and application of
the Interboro doctrine).
6. The doctrine is named for the Second Circuit's decision in NLRB v. Interboro
Contractors, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967), enforcing 157 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1966). In brief, the
doctrine holds that individual employees who seek to invoke the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement are engaged in concerted activity for purposes of § 7 of the
NLRA.
7. 104 S. Ct. at 1507-08. The entire clause read:
Employer shall not require employees to take out on the streets or highways
any vehicle that is not in safe operating condition or equipped with safety appli-
ances prescribed by law. It shall not be a violation of the Agreement where
employees refuse to operate such equipment unless such refusal is unjustified.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) provides that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer-to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 157 of this title."
9. 29 U.S.C. § 157:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right
to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
10. 104 S. Ct. at 1510.
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though the term obviously includes "activities of employees who
have joined together in order to achieve common goals."" When
an individual appears to have acted alone, the issue is the "precise
manner" in which that individual's conduct "must be linked to the
actions of fellow employees" in order to satisfy section 7's require-
ment of concert.12
The Court had little difficulty linking Brown's individual action
to the concerted activity of contract negotiation. The Court said
that a claim of contractual right is "an integral part" of the process
of collective bargaining. When an employee claims rights under a
contract, then he "reharness[es] the power of [the] group to ensure
the enforcement" of those rights. 13 Such reassembly of "his fellow
union members to reenact their decision," Brennan said, amounts
to a "concerted activity in a very real sense."' 14 An individual's claim
of a contractual right also benefits other employees. Such claims
"preserv[e] the integrity of the entire process" and "breathe life"
into the agreement."
Interestingly, the Supreme Court accepted the Interboro version
of constructive concerted activity as a reasonable interpretation of
the Act at about the same time that the NLRB rejected another form
of constructive concerted activity. In Meyers Industries,'6 the Board
overruled the line of cases emanating from Alleluia Cushion Co., 17 in
which an individual employee's conduct was deemed concerted if it
was "on behalf of" or "for the benefit of" other employees, whether
or not the other employees were aware of the conduct.' 8 Unlike
Interboro, Alleluia Cushion applied in nonunion work places when
there was no collective bargaining agreement in effect. In Meyers,
the Board said that, henceforth, employees could be engaged in
concerted activity only if they acted with, or on the authority of,
other employees.' 9 Ironically, Meyers and City Disposal combined to
protect employees who act alone only when they are already union-
ized. Individual employees in nonunion work places, who do not
11. Id. at 1511.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1512.
15. Id. at 1513.
16. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 493 (1984), enforcement denied, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
17. 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).
18. See, e.g., Ontario Knife Co., 247 N.L.R.B. 1288, enforcement denied, 637 F.2d 840
(2d Cir. 1980); Steere Dairy, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1350 (1978).
19. 268 N.L.R.B. at 497.
1986]
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have a union to protect them and must, therefore, rely exclusively
on the NLRA, act at their peril.
On the surface it does not seem controversial to conclude that
an employee engages in concerted activity when he invokes rights
found in a labor contract. Collective bargaining is one of the clear-
est examples of conduct protected by the Act and is, in fact, the very
activity that the legislation was intended to foster.2 0 Enforcement of
collectively bargained rights is simply part of what has been aptly
called "the continuous process of.collective bargaining."' 2' More-
over, group interest in the enforcement of the collective agreement
is not fictitious, which was the problem with Alleluia Cushion.
Whether invoked by one or more workers, all employees in the bar-
gaining unit have an interest in the enforcement of rights won
through the concerted activity of contract negotiations.
Even though the Court's interpretation seems innocuous, its
decision is of dubious merit. In its zeal to protect the rights of indi-
vidual employees the Court ignored the ordinary process of contract
administration and, instead, thrust the NLRB into the unaccus-
tomed role of contract enforcer.
One question the Court did not resolve in City Disposal is
whether employee Brown had a contractual right to refuse to work.
A good faith invocation of a contractual right is concerted activity.
Finding concert, however, is only half the battle; the activity must
also be protected.2 2 The Court held that whether an individual's
claim of right is protected depends upon the validity of his contrac-
tual interpretation:
In this case, because Brown reasonably and honestly in-
voked his right to avoid driving unsafe trucks, his action
was concerted. It may be that the collective-bargaining
agreement prohibits an employee from refusing to drive a
truck that he reasonably believes to be unsafe, but that is,
in fact, perfectly safe. If so, Brown's action was concerted
but unprotected.2"
The Court remanded the case to the Board to determine whether
Brown's conduct was protected by the statute. However, the Board
20. See Bethel, supra note 5, at 600 nn. 112-114.
21. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
22. For a discussion of the distinction between protected and unprotected activity,
see R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,
302-25 (1976).
23. 104 S. Ct. at 1516.
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will not engage in statutory interpretation; rather, the Board will do
nothing more than interpret the contract.
Although the Board is not empowered to resolve mere contract
disputes, it does have the right to interpret contracts in order to
decide unfair labor practice cases.24 In the typical case, for example,
the Board might interpret contractual language to decide whether
the parties had waived their obligation to bargain over a mandatory
subject or whether the employer was authorized by contract to act
unilaterally. Even though contract interpretation may be involved,
the Board in such cases clearly enforces a statutory proscription.
That is, it interprets the contract only to insure that neither party
avoids the statutory obligation to bargain in good faith over wages,
hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment.2 5 In
City Disposal, the contract, not the statute, was the source of the em-
ployee's right to refuse work. To view such a refusal as a protected
concerted activity involves no issue of statutory interpretation.
Contract rights are merely elevated to the status of statutory entitle-
ments, thereby enabling employees to invoke NLRB unfair labor
practice procedures to enforce rights won in collective bargaining.
The problem is the effect this approach could have on labor arbitra-
tion and on the union's status as exclusive representative.
The Board's power is limited, by statute, to deciding contested
issues in election cases and to resolving unfair labor practice cases.
Its exclusion from contract enforcement was not accidental. To the
contrary, the statute encourages settlement of contractual disputes
"by a method agreed upon by the parties."26 That method is usu-
ally labor arbitration, which enjoys a preferred legal status primarily
as the result of favored treatment by the Supreme Court. The
Court's decisions, for example, provide for the specific enforcement
of agreements to arbitrate, 27 limit judicial scrutiny of arbitrable
grievances,28 and shield arbitrators' decisions from significant
appellate review.2 9 The Court's opinions have also recognized the
24. See, e.g., NLRBv. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
25. The obligation to bargain in good faith is enforced as an unfair labor practice.
See NLRA, § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (employer) and § 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(3) (union).
26. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 203(c), 29 U.S.C. § 173:
"Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desira-
ble method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpre-
tation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement."
27. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
28. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
29. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
1986]
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union's control over the grievance-arbitration process and its right
to refuse to process even a meritorious grievance, as long as its deci-
sion is not arbitrary, discriminatory, or made in bad faith." Central-
izing such power in the hands of the union is thought to increase its
stature and, therefore, its ability to deal with the employer.3 ' Even
though some individual rights are sacrificed, the power of the group
makes the union a more formidable force in conflict resolution. In
addition, the finality of the union's decision (and of arbitration gen-
erally) lends dignity to the parties' dispute resolution process, and
thus encourages its use rather than a resort to economic force.
The Court in City Disposal simply ignored this system of dispute
resolution. After his discharge, employee Brown filed a grievance.
The union refused to process it.32 Neither the Supreme Court's
opinion nor the Board's opinion indicates the reason for the union's
decision. Moreover, neither opinion suggests that the union's inac-
tion breached its duty of fair representation. Under accepted princi-
ples prevailing before City Disposal, therefore, Brown's case was
finished. He had no right to process the grievance on his own, and
he could not sue his employer for breach of contract. Under the
procedure approved by the Court, however, Brown will now bring
his contractual claim to the Board under the guise of a section
8(a)(1) charge. The effect seems clear: the union's control over the
arbitration process and its stature with both the employees and the
employer suffer, and the exclusive procedure adopted by the parties
for the resolution of contractual disputes is bypassed. Moreover, the
Board becomes an instrument of contract enforcement, a role not
assigned to it by Congress and one in which it has little expertise or
experience.
The primary justification for City Disposal would appear to be a
concern for the protection of individual rights, a policy whose im-
portance cannot be doubted. The decision, however, actually pro-
tects contractual rather than statutory rights and, in the process,
overlooks the nature of collectively bargained entitlements. In City
Disposal, the parties negotiated their contract with the understanding
that it would be enforced in the grievance-arbitration procedure. As
such, the contractual rights at issue were not independent entitle-
ments subject to judicial sanction or administrative enforcement.
They were no more valuable than the contractual procedures used
30. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
31. Id. at 191.
32. 104 S. Ct. at 1509.
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to enforce them. The contractual process protects individual em-
ployees and also fosters private collective bargaining by insulating
the relationship from governmental intrusion. City Disposal, how-
ever, ignores the bargain of the parties and, while seeking to enforce
individual rights, denigrates the union's ability to represent both in-
dividual and collective interests.
Rather than the interpretation of labor contracts, the Board's
sole function should be to insure that employees have access to the
contract enforcement procedures contained in the collective bar-
gaining agreement."3 The Supreme Court recognized in City Dispo-
sal that grievance administration is an integral part of the process of
collective bargaining. Employees who seek to invoke . such
processes, then, are surely engaged in protected concerted activity
whether or not their grievance has merit. The employees, however,
should have no protected right to seek redress in any other forum or
by any other method. In City Disposal, the Court should have real-
ized that enforcement of individual rights was not the only labor
policy at issue. Insuring nondiscriminatory access to the grievance
procedure would not have interfered with the union's role in con-
tract administration and its obligation to represent the entire bar-
gaining unit. Equally important, it would have insured employees
all that they can reasonably expect from the parties' bargain-the
opportunity to present their claims under the mandatory dispute
resolution mechanism of the contract.
B. Federal Preemption of State Tort Action
In July 1981, Roderick S. Lueck injured his back while carrying
a pig to a friend's house for a pig roast." Lueck's employer, Allis-
Chalmers Corporation, was party to a collective bargaining agree-
ment with the United Auto Workers that contained a health and dis-
ability plan covering his injury. Lueck received disability benefits,
33. Section 9(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), permits individual employees "to
present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the
intervention of the bargaining representative." Any such settlement must be consistent
with the collective bargaining agreement and the bargaining representative must be
given the right to be present at any discussion of a § 9(a) grievance. The force of the
§ 9(a) proviso allows employers to deal with individual employees concerning a griev-
ance without fear of a § 8(a)(5) violation (refusal to bargain in good faith). Emporium
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50, 61 n. 12.
Given the narrowness of the Supreme Court's interpretation in Emporium Capwell, § 9(a)
should mean only that, when a collective bargaining agreement contains a grievance-
arbitration procedure, individuals should have the opportunity to use that procedure
without the intervention of the bargaining agent. See Bethel, supra note 5, at 618-19.
34. Allis-Chalmer Corp. v. Lueck, 105 S.Ct. 1904 (1985).
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but alleged that Allis-Chalmers periodically and in bad faith ordered
Aetna Life and Casualty Company (the plan's administrator) to sus-
pend payments.3 5 Although disputes concerning contractual insur-
ance plans were arbitrable under the collective bargaining
agreement,3 6 Lueck ignored his contractual remedies and filed suit
in state court against both Allis-Chalmers and Aetna seeking relief
under a state-created tort for bad faith handling of an insurance
claim. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that Lueck's com-
plaint stated a cause of action under state law and was not pre-
empted by federal law.3 7 The court reasoned that the plaintiff's
claim did not arise under the labor contract, but instead, alleged a
breach of duty owed as a consequence of the relationship estab-
lished by contract. Making a distinction more superficial than real,
the court said that the breach of contract itself was irrelevant to de-
termining whether the defendant acted in bad faith.3 8 The court
said that the state claim was not preempted by federal law because
the administration of the disability plan under the collective bar-
gaining agreement was "a matter only of peripheral concern to fed-
eral labor law. '
3 9
In Allis-Chalmer Corp. v. Lueck,4 ° the Supreme Court reversed.
There is, of course, little question but that suits to enforce the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement must be brought under section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,4 ' and that resolution
of such claims is controlled by the substantive body of federal law
developed under section 301.42 Indeed, federal law controls
whether the suit is brought in state or federal court.43
In reversing the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the
Court noted that Congress has not indicated the extent to which
35. Id. at 1908.
36. The contract contained a four-step grievance procedure. A separate letter of
understanding established a special three-step procedure for disability grievances. If the
dispute was not settled under that procedure, it could be pursued to arbitration under
the contractual procedure. Id. at 1907-08 & n. 1.
37. Lueck v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 115 Wis. 2d 559, 576, 342 N.W.2d 699, 707 (1984).
38. Id. at 566, 342 N.W.2d at 702-03.
39. Id.
40. 105 S. Ct. 1904 (1985).
41. Section 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), provides: "Suits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization. . . may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
42. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). For a discus-
sion of the Lincoln Mills case and § 301 lawsuits generally, see R. GORMAN, supra note 22,
at 543-51.
43. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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section 301 was intended to preempt state law.44 The Court held,
therefore, that a local rule exists independently " 'unless it conflicts
with federal law or would frustrate the federal scheme, or unless the
courts discern from the totality of the circumstances that Congress
sought to occupy the field to the exclusion of the states.'-4"
In Allis-Chalmers, the Court said that the labor policies devel-
oped under section 301 require that its preemptive effect extend be-
yond mere contract violation lawsuits. The Court held that the
meaning to be given a collective bargaining agreement must be sub-
ject to a uniform body of federal law, whether the question arises in
a breach of contract action or in a tort action.4 6 Otherwise, the pol-
icy favoring uniformity-which facilitates collective bargaining and
contract enforcement-would be frustrated.4 7 Despite the interest
in uniform enforcement, the Court noted that not every employ-
ment-related state action was preempted by section 301: "Clearly,
§ 301 does not grant the parties to a collective-bargaining agree-
ment the ability to contract for what is illegal under state law."'48
Moreover, federal law does not preempt state rules that regulate
conduct or establish rights independent of contract.49 State-recog-
nized rights that depend for their existence on the labor contract are
preempted, however.50 The question, the Court said, was whether
44. 105 S. Ct. at 1910.
45. Id. (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)).
46. 105 S.Ct. at 1911.
47. The Court explained the policies favoring uniformity by quoting at length from
Lucas Flour:
[T]he subject matter of § 301(a) "is peculiarly one that calls for uniform law."
• * . The possibility that individual contract terms might have different mean-
ings under state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence
upon both the negotiation and administration of collective agreements. Be-
cause neither party could be certain of the rights which it had obtained or con-
ceded, the process of negotiating an agreement would be made immeasurably
more difficult by the necessity of trying to formulate contract provisions in such
a way as to contain the same meaning under two or more systems of law which
might someday be invoked in enforcing the contract. Once the collective bar-
gain was made, the possibility of conflicting substantive interpretation under
competing legal systems would tend to stimulate and prolong disputes as to its
interpretation . . . [and] might substantially-impede the parties' willingness to
agree to contract terms providing for final arbitral or judicial resolution of
disputes.
Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1910 (quoting Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 103-04)). The Court
concluded: "Were state law allowed to determine the meaning intended by the parties
in adopting a particular contract phrase or term, all the evils addressed in Lucas Flour
would recur." 105 S. Ct. at 1911.
48. 105 S. Ct. at 1912.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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the state-created action at issue was independent of the labor con-
tract or whether its existence was intertwined with the collective bar-
gaining agreement.5'
The Court rejected the Wisconsin court's assertion that the tort
suit was independent of any contract claim. The Wisconsin court
had argued that even though the obligation to pay disability benefits
was created by contract, the tort action concerned the unreasonable
delay of those payments, an issue that did not necessarily depend on
contract interpretation. 52 The Supreme Court repudiated that ra-
tionale for two reasons: First, it said that the state court had no
right to assume that the collective bargaining agreement created no
implied rights, including an implied right to timely payment.53
Whether it did is a question of contract interpretation to be decided
under federal law. 54 Second, the Court observed that any insur-
ance-related dispute was an arbitrable issue under the collective bar-
gaining agreement and questioned whether an arbitrator would
conclude that there was no implied right to timely payment. Even if
the duty to act in good faith differs from the contractual duty to pay,
the Court concluded that the duties are "tightly" bound so that the
existence of each depends on contract interpretation.55 The Court
buttressed its conclusion that the duties did not exist independently
by reviewing the origin of the state tort action. The Court said that
the tort claim was merely a device that plaintiffs could use to plead
in tort what was essentially a contract action in order to recover pu-
nitive damages: "That being so this tort claim is firmly rooted in the
expectations of the parties that must be evaluated by federal con-
tract law." 56
At the end of its opinion, almost as an afterthought, the Court
justified its decision by claiming that it was essential to safeguard
labor arbitration:
Perhaps the most harmful aspect of the Wisconsin decision
is that it would allow essentially the same suit to be brought
directly in state court without first exhausting the grievance
procedures established in the bargaining agreement. ...
Unless this suit is preempted, [the right of the parties] to
decide who is to resolve contract disputes will be lost.57
51. Id.
52. 116 Wis.2d at 574, 342 N.W.2d at 707.
53. 105 S. Ct. at 1913.
54. Id.
55. 105 S. Ct. at 1914.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1915.
[VOL. 45:179
LABOR LAW DECISIONS
There is no reason to doubt the wisdom of the Court's argument.
Any system that allows parties to bypass exclusive contractual dis-
pute resolution procedures endangers not only the bargain but the
collective bargaining relationship itself. What is confusing, how-
ever, is why this preoccupation with the welfare of labor arbitration
was absent last term when the Court decided City Disposal. That
case, in effect, permits an employee to sidestep contract enforce-
ment procedures and to take what is essentially a contract action to
the NLRB.58 City Disposal would appear to pose the same threat to
arbitration decried by the Court in Allis-Chalmers. Its decision last
term should have demonstrated the same concern.
Discussion. -Given the development of substantive law under
section 301 since Lincoln Mills,59 the Court's decision on the pre-
emption issue is hardly surprising. The Court obviously has no in-
terest in whether Wisconsin allows plaintiffs to plead contract
actions in tort for the purpose of structuring damage claims unless
the contract at issue is a collective bargaining agreement. Despite
the efforts of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, there is no serious
question that Roderick Lueck had a garden variety complaint that
his rights under the labor contract were violated. As such, his right
to a remedy was not a matter of state concern, but was to be deter-
mined in accordance with the federal law developed under section
301.
Allis-Chalmers does, however, raise an interesting issue concern-
ing the scope of federal preemption. In responding to the state's
assertion that the federal interest was merely "peripheral," the
Supreme Court explained, as it had done in the previous term, 60 the
difference between so-called Garmon preemption and the preemp-
tion doctrine at issue in Allis-Chalmers. The doctrine established in
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon6' protects the primary ju-
risdiction of the NLRB over unfair labor practice charges. Garmon
preemption prevents conflict between state tribunals and the NLRB
"by ensuring that primary responsibility for interpreting and apply-
ing this body of labor law remains with" the Board.62 Despite the
strong federal interest at stake, there are exceptions for "unusually
58. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 42.
60. See Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders, 104 S. Ct. 3179
(1984).
61. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
62. 104 S. Ct. at 3186-87. For a general discussion of Garmon preemption, see R.
GORMAN, supra note 22, at 766-86.
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'deeply rooted' local interests.''63 By contrast, the Court has de-
scribed the doctrine at work in Allis-Chalmers as "preemption which
is based on actual federal protection of the conduct at issue. "64 In
such cases, the balancing test employed in Garmon is irrelevant,
"since Congress, acting within its power under the commerce
clause, has provided that federal law must prevail."65
In light of the Court's conclusion that rights that "can be
waived or altered by agreement of private parties, are pre-
empted,"'6 6 one question that certainly arises is what effect Allis-
Chalmers will have on state wrongful discharge actions. Some state
courts have made significant inroads on the common law employ-
ment-at-will doctrine, either by applying a so-called public policy ex-
ception, or by finding a contractual assurance of continued
employment.67 If a plaintiff's state court suit depends on a right to
employment expressed or implied in a collective bargaining agree-
ment, it seems clearly preempted under Allis-Chalmers. Such a con-
clusion is inescapable because the plaintiff's right to continued
employment is then merely a question of contract interpretation,
which is precisely the reason Lueck's claim warranted preemption.
The result is less clear, however, if a plaintiff claims relief under a
public policy exception.6 s In such cases, the plaintiff's right to a
remedy does not depend on contract interpretation, but on protec-
tion of strongly felt state interests. Those interests exist independ-
ent of the labor contract and, presumably, cannot be waived in a
private agreement to which the state is not a party and with which it
has no significant concern. Although the Court did not address the
issue in Allis-Chalmers, its language makes it seem likely that the deci-
sion does not preempt state wrongful discharge actions based on a
63. See Brown, 104 S. Ct. at 3187; see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego District
Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978) (state jurisdiction over trespassory aspects
of union's picketing not preempted).
64. Brown, 104 S.Ct. at 3186.
65. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1912 n. 9.
66. Id. at 1912.
67. See, e.g., Note, Protecting at [Vill Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980).
68. The public policy exception is usually applied to prevent employers from dis-
charging employees who have refused to violate the law or have otherwise exercised
rights under law. See, e.g., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir.
1979) (discharge of an at-will employee for refusal to take a polygraph examination
gives rise to a cause of action for tortious discharge under Pennsylvania law); Tamenv v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (em-
ployee discharged after refusing to participate in an illegal price-fixing scheme can main-
tain an action in tort).
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public policy theory.69
C. Discrimination Against Undocumented Workers
In Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 70 the Court faced two different issues
and published opinions that produced two different majorities.
Seven Justices agreed that undocumented aliens are employees for
purposes of the NLRA and that an employer violates section
8(a)(3) 7 1 when it reports them to the immigration authorities in re-
taliation for their union activities. By a vote of 5-4, however, the
Court limited the authority of the Board to issue make whole relief
and admonished the Seventh Circuit for impermissibly expanding
the Board's original order.
The decision arose out of a representation case in Chicago. Af-
ter losing an election, the employer filed objections contending that
six of his employees were in the country illegally, a fact that he had
known for some time. The day after the Regional Director over-
turned the objections, the employer asked the Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service (INS) to investigate his employees. Within a
month, INS arrested five of the employees and allowed them to
leave the country voluntarily. 2 The Board found that the em-
ployer's action was taken in retaliation for the employees' union ac-
tivity and was, therefore, a constructive discharge in violation of
sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act. As a remedy, the Board is-
sued the usual cease and desist order, but disagreed with the admin-
istrative law judge's recommendation that an offer of reinstatement
with back pay remain open for six months. 73 The Board also re-
jected the ALJ's invitation to award four weeks minimum back pay,
which had been premised on his belief that the ordinary back pay
calculation would be tolled because the discriminatees were unavail-
able for work. Branding the ALJ's recommendations "unnecessarily
69. The Court said: "We pass no judgment on whether an independent, non-negoti-
able, state-imposed duty which does not create similar problems of contract interpreta-
tion would be pre-empted under similar circumstances." 105 S. Ct. at 1914 n. 11.
70. 104 S. Ct. 2803 (1984).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
"by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." In
its most common application, § 8(a)(3) prohibits employers from retaliating against em-
ployees on account of their union activity. For a discussion of the coverage of § 8(a)(3),
see R. GORMAN, supra note 22, at 137-42, 326-38.
72. 104 S. Ct. at 2806-07.
73. The AI.J's recommendation was based on his view that the inability of the em-
ployees to return to the United States rendered reemployment unlikely. 234 N.L.R.B.
1187, 1192 (1978).
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speculative," the Board entered a "conventional" order of reinstate-
ment and back pay, and stated that "[t]he appropriate forum for de-
termining the issues relating to [the employees'] availability for
work is a compliance proceeding.
74
On review, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the Board's finding
of a violation, but modified the remedy significantly. Deciding the
issue that the Board had put off, the court held that the employees
could be reinstated only if they reentered the country legally and
were "permitted by law to be employed in the United States."' 75 In
addition, the court ordered that the reinstatement offer remain
open for four years, that it be written in Spanish, and that delivery of
the offers allow for verification of receipt. 76 The court also noted
that, under ordinary circumstances, the discriminatees might not be
eligible to receive any back pay because they were unavailable for
work after leaving the country.7 7 The court concluded that it would
"effectuate the policies of the Act to set a minimum amount of back
pay" since the employer's discriminatory conduct cost the employ-
ees their jobs. 78 Although the court conceded that the amount of
time the employees might have remained employed before "in-
dependent detection" by INS was "obviously conjectural," it
thought an award of six months was reasonable. 79 The Board acqui-
esced in the court's modified remedy without issuance of a new
opinion.8 °
The Unfair Labor Practice.-As noted, seven members of the
Supreme Court agreed that undocumented aliens were included
within the protection of the Act and that the employer's discrimina-
tory conduct violated section 8(a)(3). Only Justices Powell and
Rehnquist dissented, finding it "unlikely that Congress intended the
term 'employee' to include . . . persons wanted . . . for the viola-
tion of our criminal laws,' thereby lumping undocumented work-
ers into the same category as axe murderers and child molesters.
8 2
74. Id. at 1187. Subsequently, the Board denied a motion for clarification filed by
the General Counsel, who claimed that the Board's remedial order might violate immi-
gration laws. 246 N.L.R.B. 788 (1979).
75. 672 F.2d. 592, 606 (7th Cir. 1982).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 104 S. Ct. at 2808 n. 4.
81. Id. at 2820 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82. Clearly, even child molesters and axe murderers are covered by the Act and can
be represented for purposes of collective bargaining if they otherwise perform a job
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The majority, however, had little trouble classifying such workers as
"employees" for the purposes of the Act, pointing to the "striking"
breadth of the statute and the fact that the few exemptions from
coverage did not include illegal aliens.83 Moreover, the majority
found that including such workers within the protection of the Act
was consistent with its purpose of fostering collective bargaining:
If undocumented alien employees were excluded from par-
ticipation in union activities and from protections against
employer intimidation, there would be created a subclass
of workers without a comparable stake in the collective
goals of their legally resident coworkers, thereby eroding
the unity of all the employees and impeding effective col-
lective bargaining.8 4
The Court rejected the contention that inclusion of undocu-
mented workers under the NLRA conflicted with the policies of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.8 5 It said that the INA was con-
cerned primarily with the admission of aliens and the treatment of
lawfully admitted aliens, not with the employment conditions of
those entering the country illegally.86 It noted that "[a] primary
purpose in restricting immigration is to preserve jobs for American
workers."8 " By furnishing illegal workers the protection of the
NLRA, the incentive for employers to replace legal residents with
illegal ones might be diminished. The result would be a reduction
in employment opportunities for illegal aliens, which, in turn, would
presumably discourage illegal entry. 8
Although it called it a "more difficult issue,"8 9 the Court had no
difficulty concluding that the employer's conduct violated section
8(a)(3). The employer argued, presumably with a straight face, that
it was the employees' illegal status and not his action that prompted
included within a bargaining unit. Justices Powell and Rehnquist, however, seem to im-
ply that undocumented aliens are a criminal class and, therefore, fall wholly outside the
protection of the law. Even though their presence in the country is illegal, however, the
Court recognized that undocumented aliens violate no law by accepting employment in
the United States. 104 S. Ct. at 2809. Moreover, nothing in the NLRA indicates that
their presence in the country is so reprehensible as to leave them totally at their peril in
their relationship with employers.
83. 104 S. Ct. at 2809.
84. Id.
85. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1970 & Supp. 1985).
86. 104 S. Ct. at 2809. The Court also noted that it is not illegal for employers to
hire undocumented aliens. Id.
87. Id. at 2810.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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their fate. The Court, however, agreed with the ALJ's conclusion
that " 'but for [petitioner's] letter to Immigration, the dis-
criminatees would have continued to work indefinitely.' 90 Since
the report was made solely in retaliation for union activity, the viola-
tion was clear-cut. 91
The Remedy.-Justice O'Connor's treatment of the remedy com-
manded a smaller majority. ChiefJustice Burger and Justice White,
joined her, as did Justices Powell and Rehnquist, who believed that
undocumented workers fall outside the protection of the Act and,
therefore, are entitled to no remedy at all.92
The most controversial issue before the Court was the Seventh
Circuit's decision to modify the Board's remedy and to grant the
discriminatees six month's back pay. The order fell for two reasons:
first, the modification exceeded the appellate court's limited power
on judicial review by divesting the Board of its primary responsibil-
ity to formulate remedies;9 3 second, the court's order exceeded the
Board's remedial power.94 Although the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that the Board has broad power to devise remedies, it said
that a remedy must "be tailored to the unfair labor practice it is
intended to redress."9 5 Specifically, back pay should be awarded
only for actual, and not speculative, consequences. The Court con-
cluded that the six month award set by the Seventh Circuit was "not
90. Id. (quoting the opinion of the ALJ, 234 N.L.R.B. at 1191).
91. For the burden of proof in a § 8(a)(3) case, see NLRB v. Transportation Manage-
ment Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983). The Court also rejected the employer's claim that its
action was justified under the first amendment pursuant to the Court's decision in Bill
Johnson's Restaurant, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, (1983). 104 S. Ct. at 2812. In Bill
Johnson's, the Court held that an employer's libel suit against a union was not an enjoin-
able unfair labor practice unless the suit was filed in retaliation and lacked a reasonable
basis. The Court concluded that that reasoning did not apply in Sure-Tan. In Bill John-
son's, the employer's action was retaliatory, as was also true in Sure-Tan. However, in Bill
Johnson's the employer asserted a state-created right to protect its own interest. Thus,
the Court concluded that the right of access to the courts was protected by the first
amendment regardless of the retaliatory motive. In Sure-Tan, however, the employer did
not suffer "a comparable, legally protected injury .. . [and] did not invoke the INS
administrative process in order to seek the redress of any wrongs committed against
[it]." 104 S. Ct. at 2812. Moreover, in Sure-Tan, there was no conflict between the
Board's unfair labor practice jurisdiction and a state interest. Therefore, the issues of
federalism raised in Bill Johnson's were absent. Id.
92. Justices Powell and Rehnquist concurred in a separate opinion. 104 S. Ct. at
2820.
93. Id. at 2812-13.
94. Id. at 2813.
95. Id.
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sufficiently tailored" to the actual harm suffered, and noted the ab-
sence of any evidence supporting the lower court's decision.';"
The Supreme Court approved the Board's original order, which
contemplated that calculation of back pay would occur in subse-
quent compliance proceedings. The Court made clear, however,
that those proceedings would take place only if the discriminatees
were lawfully admitted to the country. In that way, the congres-
sional policy of discouraging illegal immigration could best be
served. Moreover, the Court agreed with the ALJ's assertion that
back pay liability should be tolled during that period when the dis-
criminatees were not lawfully entitled to be in this country. 7 As a
practical matter, the Court's decision precludes any relief at all for
the discriminatees and imposes little sanction on the employer.98 It
was exactly this prospect that prompted the Seventh Circuit to im-
pose a minimum back pay award. The Supreme Court, however,
was unmoved: "Any perceived deficiencies in the NLRA's existing
remedial arsenal can only be addressed by congressional action." 9
The issues raised by Sure-Tan are not easy to resolve. The em-
ployer's misconduct was so blatant that the Seventh Circuit's reac-
tion is easily understood. Nevertheless, the Board's powers are
remedial, not punitive and, while the Supreme Court managed to
avoid the issue, the court of appeals' order smacks of a penalty.
There is scant support for Brennan's dissenting argument that the
Board's decision to support the Seventh Circuit's order "rests
squarely upon its own judgment that this award estimates with a fair
degree of precision the period that these employees would have
continued working . . . had petitioners not reported them to the
INS."' 0 The Board wrote no opinion supporting that position and,
according to the majority, took no evidence on the issue. 10 The
Seventh Circuit's entire discussion of the matter is limited to one
sentence, which does no more than conclude that six months "is a
96. Id. The court of appeals' entire discussion concerning the issue was in one sen-
tence: "Although that period of time is obviously conjectural, we think that six months
is a reasonable assumption." 672 F.2d. at 606.
97. 104 S. Ct. at 2815.
98. The only real effect of the Board's remedy was a standard cease and desist order,
issued pursuant to § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
99. 104 S. Ct. at 2815. The Court also reversed the Seventh Circuit's requirements
that the reinstatement offers be drafted in Spanish, that receipt of the offers be verified,
and that they be held open for four years. In each instance the rationale was the same:
the court had no basis for "displacing the Board's discretionary judgment." Id. at 2816.
100. Id. at 2818 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101. Id. at 2813 n. 9.
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reasonable assumption."'' 0 2 It is true that back pay awards often
cannot be proved with precision and that the Board sometimes esti-
mates the amount due an aggrieved employee. In those cases, how-
ever, there is a least some standard affording an educated guess.'0 3
In Sure-Tan, there was nothing but conjecture.
Justice Brennan correctly asserts, however, that limiting the
Board's remedial power might undercut the policy that the majority
purported to implement. As discussed earlier, the majority claimed
that its decision to include undocumented workers within the pro-
tection of the Act would lessen the incentive to hire illegal workers
and, therefore, increase employment opportunities for lawful resi-
dents. However, since the effect of Sure-Tan is to deprive undocu-
mented employees of any effective remedy for unlawful
discrimination, the grant of section 7 rights is illusory, as is any pur-
ported effect on employers.10 4
Sure-Tan is discouraging not only because it affords no relief to
the victims of unlawful discrimination, but also because it permits an
employer to violate the law and then to interpose the consequences
of its misconduct as a bar to any remedy. Although the result is
harsh for the discriminatees, the Court was obviously troubled by
the conflicting aims of our immigration policy and our national la-
bor laws. On the broader issue, however, this case again points out
the inability of the Board to deal with egregious violations through
the limited remedial powers of section 10(c).105 The Court de-
ferred, saying that was an issue for Congress. One can only hope
that Congress will listen.
D. Employer Relative in Bargaining Units
In NLRB v. Action Automotive, Inc. ,16 the Supreme Court consid-
ered the NLRB's practice of excluding from bargaining units certain
relatives of the owners or managers of closely held corporations.
102. 672 F.2d. at 606.
103. As the Court noted, in cases such as NLRB v. Superior Roofing Co., 460 F.2d
1240 (9th Cir. 1972), the Board has estimated back pay by using a formula based on
seniority. See also Buncher v. NLRB, 405 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1968) (seniority standard is a
rationally permissible device to fashion back pay remedy). The Court went on to note
that in Sure-Tan, however, the court of appeals "estimated" back pay "without any evi-
dence whatsoever as to the period of time" the discharged employees might have con-
tinued working. 104 S. Ct. at 2814 n. 11.
104. Id. at 2819 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
105. For a more detailed discussion of the Board's remedial deficiencies, see Bethel,
Profiting From Unfair Labor Practices: A Proposal to Regulate Management Representatives, 79
Nw. U.L. REV. 506 (1984).
106. 105 S. Ct. 984 (1985).
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Although the Act exempts from its coverage "any individual em-
ployed by his parents or spouse,"' 7 the reach of the exclusion has
been narrowed to relatives of sole proprietors, partners, and major-
ity shareholders. 0 8 Nevertheless, the Board has used its unit deter-
mination power under section 9(b)10 9 to exclude not only relatives
of part-owners, but also relatives of managers who have no signifi-
cant ownership interest. Most often, the Board has concluded that
such relatives have no community of interest with other employees.
Although the Board has consistently claimed the power to make
such exclusions, its reasoning has varied.
Initially, the Board excluded close relatives simply because of
their ties to management." I0 In one case, for example, the Board
reasoned that a son and a nephew of the president of a small com-
pany shared no community of interest with the other employees be-
cause "[t]he interests of such near relatives are identified not with
their fellow-workers, but with management itself.""' In response
to judicial criticism,'" 2 the Board changed course and decided that
the mere fact of a family relationship was insufficient to warrant ex-
clusion from a bargaining unit. Rather, the Board said it would look
for evidence that a relative "enjoys a special status which allies his
interests with those of management."'"1 3 Subsequently, however,
the Board reverted to a community of interest standard employing
factors other than special status. In such cases, the fact of the rela-
tionship and the consequences inferred therefrom were often used
to justify exclusion." 4 At least two courts of appeals have criticized
107. NLRA, § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982).
108. In Action Automotive, the Court recognized that the exclusion from employee sta-
tus in corporations is limited to children or spouses of those individuals who own at least
50% of the business. 105 S. Ct. at 989 n. 7. The exemption also applies to children and
spouses of partners and sole proprietors. Id. at 990 n. 2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. NLRA, § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) directs the Board to determine "the unit ap-
propriate for the purposes of collective bargaining." For a discussion of the criteria
used by the Board in making such determinations, see R. GORMAN, supra note 22, at 66-
92.
110. See, e.g., Louis Weinberg Assoc., Inc., 13 N.L.R.B. 66 (1939).
111. P.A. Mueller & Sons, Inc., 105 N.L.R.B. 552, 553 (1953).
112. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sexton, 203 F.2d 940 (1953).
113. International Metal Products Co., 107 NLRB 65, 67 (1953). See also American
Steel Buck Corp., 107 NLRB 554 (1953) (general manager's nephew acting as liaison
between employees and management enjoys special status); Cherrin Corp. v. NLRB, 349
F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1965) (relative's special status evidenced by the following: she was
not required to punch a time clock; her absences for illness were not recorded, and she
was not reprimanded for tardiness).
114. See, e.g., Foam Rubber City 2 of Florida, Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. 623 (1967) (children
excluded, not because of special status, but because interests more closely aligned with
management than with other employees).
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the Board for a "zig-zag" approach, sometimes deciding cases on a
special status theory and sometimes, without explanation, eschew-
ing special status in favor of a community of interest rationale.' 15
In Action Automotive, the business was owned equally by three
brothers, each of whom was active in the company's operation. The
Board excluded two employees: the mother of the three owners and
the wife of one of them. The Board noted that the mother lived
with one of the brothers and communicated regularly with the other
two. The wife lived with her husband (the company president) and
sometimes took coffee breaks in his office." 6 Initially, the Board
excluded the wife, in part because of special job-related benefits.
The Board, however, abandoned that position before the Supreme
Court, 117 thus raising the issue of whether it could exclude relatives
under a community of interest test that did not include the existence
of special status.
The Supreme Court upheld the Board's test. It claimed that
the Board no longer followed a policy of automatic exclusion, but
considered a "variety of factors" in deciding whether an owner's rel-
atives should be excluded from the unit.'' 8 Those factors included
financial dependence, the extent of family involvement in the busi-
ness, and the existence of special job benefits (the last factor being
relevant, but not necessary). The presence of such factors could jus-
tify a conclusion that the relatives had no community of interest with
the other employees. For example, the Board could reasonably in-
fer that close relatives, especially those who live with an owner,
would receive more attention from management than other employ-
ees and that they might identify with "business interests" rather
than with the interest of the unit. Also, the possibility existed that
other employees would be inhibited by the participation of a man-
ager's relatives in bargaining unit affairs. 1 9
Presumably in response to Justice Stevens' charge that Chief
Justice Burger's majority opinion evidenced a "pro-union ration-
ale"' ° (probably one of the few times that Justice Burger has been
accused of being pro-union), the Court explained that the Board's
rule was not intended to screen out antiunion voters; "[r]ather, the
115. See Linn Gear Co. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1979) and cases cited therein
at 794-15; NLRB v. Caravelle Woods Products, Inc., 504 F.2d 1181 (7th Cir. 1974) and
cases cited therein at 1185-86.
116. 105 S. Ct. at 986.
117. Id. at 987 n.2.
118. Id. at 988.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 991 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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family member is excluded . ..because the Board determines on
the basis of objective factors that he lacks common interests with
fellow employees who are not so related."' 2 ' Even though the effect
of the Board's policy might be to favor unions, the Court said that
disparate impact by itself does not violate the Board's obligation of
neutrality. Indeed, the Court speculated that every unit determina-
tion favored either management or labor. 122
Although the case obviously has limited application, the issues
raised in Action Automotive are both interesting and difficult. No one
doubts the range of the Board's discretion in unit determination
cases. However, decisions involving family members have a more
significant effect on the excluded employees. Typically, unit deter-
minations involve consideration ofjob-related factors, such as simi-
larity in working conditions, abilities, and job tasks. Employees are
excluded from a bargaining unit because they have no community of
interest with those workers comprising the bulk of the unit. Typi-
cally, that means that theirjobs or other relevant working conditions
are dissimilar from the jobs or working conditions of the unit mem-
bers. The excluded employees, however, retain their section 7
rights and, assuming they have sufficient interest, can seek collective
bargaining with other employees with whom they do share a com-
munity of interest.
In Action Automotive, however, the employees effectively were de-
nied any right to participate in collective bargaining. Since their ex-
clusion from the unit resulted from their relationship to
management rather than their job duties, they would presumably be
excluded from any collective bargaining unit. Moreover, their vir-
tual exclusion from the protection of section 7 was based merely on
inferences derived from "factors" allegedly identifying their alle-
giance to management. Even though, as the Court said in Action Au-
tomotive, statutory employees have no right to be included in
collective bargaining units, one might expect that the Board would
move carefully in denying employees the protection that it was cre-
ated to insure.
There is little evidence of such care. Although the Court as-
serted that the Board no longer applied a per se rule, the cases cited
do not support such a conclusion. For example, the Court cited
Pandick Press Midwest, Inc. ,12 as evidence that the Board measures a
121. Id. at 989.
122. Id.
123. 251 N.L.R.B. 473 (1980).
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relative's allegiance to management, in part, by asking whether the
relative lives with his or her family. However, only one member of
the Board panel that decided Pandick relied on the fact that the em-
ployee lived with her father, who was manager of the plant. 24 The
majority was content to exclude her on the basis of a more general
conclusion: "[I]t appears that [the daughter] has access to manage-
ment which, although it may not always result in easily identifiable
special privileges, gives her a status and an area of interest distinct
from that of other employees."' 2 5 Presumably, any close relative of
an employer would have access not available to other employees.
Similarly, the Court claimed that the Board considers the extent
of family ownership and involvement in the business. Such factors
were present in Action Automotive, in which a family network owned
and operated the business. Board decisions, however, make these
factors seem little more than coincidental. In Pandick, for example,
the employee-relative's father owned less than 1% of the company's
stock. Moreover, he was not a corporate officer but merely a plant
manager.'2 6 Nonetheless, his daughter was excluded from the unit
because of the family relationship.
The Court also cited Marvin Witherow Trucking'27 as evidence of
the Board's reliance on factors other than family membership. The
relative in question, the father of the owner, was a part-time truck
driver. The Board found no evidence of special status, but nonethe-
less, determined that the father shared no community of interest
with the other employees. Part of the Board's reasoning was
unintelligible: noting that the unit was small and that the absence of
any one driver would be a "critical impediment" to the employer,
the Board observed that "[t]he risk that such a problem will effect
[sic] the employer's operations herein is substantially less because of
the availability of [the father]."' 1 8 On the other hand, the Board
also observed that the small number of employees would give the
father considerable influence if he was included in the unit. As in
Pandick, however, the Board was most influenced merely by the fam-
ily relationship:
[I]n view of the familial bond existing between father and
son. . . we are of the opinion that [the father] would have
124. Only Board Member Fanning expressly mentioned the matter. See id. at 474 n. 5.
125. Id. at 473.
126. Id.
127. 229 N.L.R.B. 412 (1977).
128. Id. The Board did not explain why either a "critical impediment" or a family
relationship were relevant to the unit determination problem.
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a greater affinity with the interests of management than he
would with the interests of his fellow employees. It would
contradict human experience to contend that the relation-
ship between [father and son] is merely that of Employer
and part-time employee.
29
Regardless of how the Supreme Court views the Board's recent
decisions, it is clear that the primary factor influencing the Board in
unit determination cases has been the existence of a close family
relationship, which is taken by the Board to indicate antiunion senti-
ment. Although the Court and the Board prefer to explain the ra-
tionale by pointing to the lack of "common interest"' 3 ° or
"community of interest separate from that of his fellow employ-
ees," 13 1 such phrases connote nothing more than potential antago-
nism toward the union. Certainly, the factors relied on by the Board
are not foolproof. The existence of close family ties does not neces-
sarily indicate loyalty to business concerns, particularly in a case like
Pandick, in which the father had little financial interest in the com-
pany. 132 Moreover, as Justice Stevens urged in dissent, 13 even anti-
union employees are covered by the Act, and unions cannot
systematically exclude groups whose personal, religious, or business
interests might presage opposition, unless the family relationship
doctrine applies. One might have hoped, then, that the Court's
opinion would have given the Board more guidance, rather than
merely rubber stamping its conclusory approach.
One facet of the Board's theory, referred to only briefly by the
Court, deserves special mention. As noted in Action Automotive, in-
clusion of those with family ties to management "could tend to in-
hibit free expression of views and threaten the confidentiality of
union attitudes and voting."' 34 The rule approved by the Court
129. Id.
130. 105 S. Ct. at 990 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. 229 N.L.R.B. at 412.
132. As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Linn Gear Co. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 791, 793
(9th Cir. 1979):
At the time of the election, [the owner's son] was 22 years old. He may be a
maverick and have little contact with his family. He may come and go from his
residence and take meals at different times from his father. Even if he does eat
with his father, [the son] may very well be at odds with him on the issues con-
cerning the employees, the Union, and the company. . . . In short, a hearing
is necessary to shed light on these matters which bear directly on the question
of whether [the son] shares a community of interest with his fellow employees.
133. 105 S. Ct. at 990 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 988.
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rests most easily on this ground. Although its behavioral assump-
tions are subject to criticism, the Board has consistently opposed
surveillance, interrogation, and other tactics potentially threatening
to union activity.' 35 Clearly, the supposition in family relationship
cases is that the inclusion in units of employees closely aligned to
management might provoke fear of disclosure and of retaliation for
union activity.
At least two criticisms of the Board's retaliation theory are pos-
sible. First, employees other than relatives might report the union
activities of coworkers to management, but the union cannot ex-
clude them from the unit no matter how strident their antiunion at-
titudes. Second, surveillance and interrogation are unfair labor
practices, better dealt with in those procedures than in a representa-
tion case. Presumably, a manager who listened regularly to reports
of union affairs from a relative could be prosecuted for a section
8(a)(1) violation notwithstanding the voluntary activity of the
employee.
Although the Board's assumptions have not been proven em-
pirically, it seems reasonable to conclude that the spouse of a corpo-
rate officer might disclose to his wife the union activities of
coworkers. At the very least, it is reasonable to assume that other
employees might fear such disclosure. Exclusion from the unit is
not an unreasonable response to such a delicate situation, provided
sufficient evidence exists to demonstrate the relative's alliance to
management. Although employees should not be excluded from a
bargaining unit simply because of their likely opposition to the
union, exclusion is warranted when it is reasonable to conclude that
participation by close relatives would discourage the union activity
of other employees.
II. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
A. Problems for Affirmative Action?
One of the Court's most interesting cases last term-and per-
haps the one that has produced the most controversy-was Firefight-
ers Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts. 13 6 The case arose out of a 1980
consent decree that obligated the city of Memphis to increase the
135. For a general discussion of these employer unfair labor practices, see R.
GORMAN, supra note 22, at 172-78. Recent cases, however, may indicate a softening in
the Board's attitude about interrogation. See, e.g., Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B. 1176
(1984).
136. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
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hiring and promotion opportunities for blacks in the city's fire de-
partment. The decree settled a Title VII suit filed in 1977 alleging
that the city had engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination
in hiring and promotion. 3 7 Although the city did not admit any
violations of the law, it agreed to fill 50% of future job vacancies
with black applicants and to afford 20% of the promotions in each
department to black employees.13 8 Nothing in the decree spoke to
layoffs and no mention was made of compensatory seniority,
although a 1974 city-wide decree required that seniority for promo-
tions and transfers be computed "as the total seniority of that per-
son with the city."39
Citing projected budget deficits, in early 1981 the city an-
nounced layoffs affecting the fire department and invoked the "last
hired-first fired" layoff plan contained in its agreement with the
union and alluded to in the 1974 decree.' 40 The plan included
"bumping rights"'' for senior employees, and would have had a
disproportionate impact on newly hired black workers. During the
period between the original decree in 1974 and the time of layoffs,
56% of the employees hired by the fire department were black and
the representation of blacks within the department had risen from 3
or 4% to 11.5o.142 However, of the forty employees to be laid off
under the city's plan, fifteen (or 37.5%) were black.' 4 3 The effect of
demotions resulting from the city's entrenchment would have been
dramatic. For example, the court of appeals noted that almost 60%
of the employees affected by demotion under the city's plan were
black, and that "fifty-five percent of all minority Lieutenants and
46% of all minority Drivers would either have been laid off or de-
moted if the announced layoffs had occurred."' 144
The district court found that the layoffs "would have a devastat-
ing and retrogressive effect"' 14 5 on the gains in minority employ-
ment made in response to the consent decrees of 1974 and 1980,
137. In addition, the city was party to a 1974 consent decree that established an in-
terim goal of filling 50% of vacancies in the fire department with black applicants. Id. at
2581. The complete text of the 1974 consent decree is reprinted in the appendix to
Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 570-73 (6th Cir. 1982).
138. 104 S. Ct. at 2581.
139. 679 F.2d at 572.
140. 104 S. Ct. at 2581.
141. As ordinarily applied, "bumping rights" allows an employee whose job has been
eliminated to "bump", i.e., displace, a less senior employee.
142. 104 S. Ct. at 2582.
143. Id.
144. 679 F.2d at 549-50.
145. Id. at 549.
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and, on May 4, 1981, entered a temporary restraining order prohib-
iting the layoff of any black employee. Two weeks later, the court
entered a preliminary injunction ordering the city not to apply its
layoff plan "insofar as it will decrease the percentage of black lieu-
tenants, drivers, inspectors and parties that are presently em-
ployed." 146 In accordance with the court's order, the city developed
a court approved modified layoff plan that resulted in the layoff or
demotion of some white employees who had more seniority than
some remaining minority employees. 147
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
action, including the modification of the 1980 decree, even though
it disagreed with the lower court's finding that the city's seniority
system was not bona fide for purposes of section 703(h) of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4' The court of appeals held that
the district court's action simply enforced the terms of the 1980 de-
cree. Alternatively, the Sixth Circuit said that the district court had
authority to modify the decree on the basis of "new and unforseen
circumstances." 149 The Supreme Court rejected both theories, and
in the process not only limited the ability of federal courts to impose
orders overriding a bona fide seniority system, but also used lan-
guage so broad as to question the Court's commitment to class-
based affirmative relief from unlawful discrimination.
The Court made short work of the argument that the district
court's injunction and modification amounted to little more than
specific performance of its prior order. The Court noted that the
"scope of the consent decree must be discerned within its four cor-
ners" and pointed out that the 1980 decree did not mention lay-
offs. '5 The Court found no indication that the city had somehow
146. 104 S. Ct. at 2582. Subsequently, the court broadened its order to include three
more classifications. Id.
147. Id.
148. 679 F.2d at 551 n. 6. Section 703(h) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)(19 ) provides, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an un-
lawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pur-
suant to a bona fide seniority or merit system . . . provided that such differ-
ences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin. . ..
The district court held that the seniority plan was not bona fide because its operation
would have a discriminatory impact. 679 F.2d at 550-51 n. 6.
149. 104 S. Ct. at 2582 (citing 679 F.2d at 562-63). The Sixth Circuit considered the
city's economic hardships to be "new and unforeseen" circumstances.
150. Id. at 2586 (quoting United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82
(1971)).
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impliedly promised not to use its preexisting layoff plan. 5 ' More-
over, the Court rejected the argument that the injunction merely
carried out the purposes of the plan.' 52 Although the purpose of
the 1980 decree had been to remedy discriminatory hiring and pro-
motion practices, "that remedy did not include the displacement of
white employees with seniority over blacks."' 53 Nor could it have,
the Court said, since the relief ordered by the consent decree could
not "exceed the bounds of remedies that are appropriate under
Title VII."' 54 Any such seniority override would have violated the
policy of Title VII, which expressly protects employees under bona
fide seniority systems. The Court did not eliminate the possibility
that all parties to a dispute might consent to such an arrangement,
but did point out that no such issue had been raised, since neither
the union nor the white employees adversely affected by the district
court's order were parties to the consent decree.1 55
The Court also repudiated the Sixth Circuit's holding that the
district court possessed inherent authority to modify the consent de-
cree in order to prevent it from being undermined by the unfore-
seen circumstances of a layoff.'56 The court of appeals had
supported its theory primarily by pointing out the incongruity of
encouraging parties to settle discrimination cases through a consent
decree, yet denying to the district court the power to modify the
decree when necessary to vindicate Title VII policies. 57 The Sixth
Circuit said that if the case had been tried and the allegations of the
complaint proved, the district court could have overridden the bona
fide seniority system in framing a remedy. Therefore, it reasoned,
the district court should also be permitted to override the seniority
provisions in order "to effectuate the purpose of the 1980
Decree."1 5
8
151. 104 S. Ct. at 2586. "Had there been any intention to depart from the seniority
plan in the event of layoffs or demotions, it is much more reasonable to believe that
there would have been an express provision to that effect." Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. The Court did point out that an express provision might allow for remedies
exceeding those provided under Title VII. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2586, 2587 n. 9.
157. The Sixth Circuit also proposed what the Supreme Court characterized as a
'settlement theory', i.e., that the strong policy favoring voluntary settlement of Title
VII actions permitted consent decrees that encroached on seniority systems." 104 S. Ct.
at 2587. The Court rejected the application of the theory (without conceding its legiti-
macy) by pointing out that the parties had not voluntarily agreed to the terms of the
modification. Id. at 2588.
158. 679 F.2d at 566.
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The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the Sixth Cir-
cuit's premise, asserting that "rightful place" compensatory senior-
ity is appropriate only when individuals have shown themselves to
be victims of discrimination. 159 Employees are not entitled to sen-
iority awards merely because of membership in a "disadvantaged
class." 60 The Court noted that the district court had not found any
of the minority employees protected by the modification to be actual
victims of discrimination. Therefore, "[t]he Court of Appeals im-
posed on the parties as an adjunct of settlement something that
could not have been ordered had the case gone to trial and the
plaintiffs proved that a pattern or practice of discrimination
existed."' 6
The Court's conclusion was clearly premised, in part, on the
policies enunciated in section 703(h) that protect from sanction the
discriminatory effects of a bona fide seniority plan.' 6 ' The Court
noted that a contractually established seniority system could not be
displaced absent a finding that it was adopted with a discriminatory
purpose or that such action was necessary to provide make whole
relief to an actual victim of discrimination. 6 3 It also agreed with the
court of appeals' determination that the city's layoff plan was a bona
fide application of the seniority system.' 64 However, the Court's
analysis did not rest solely on the special protection that the Act
affords seniority plans. Rather, the Court examined the class-based
relief authorized by the district court to determine whether it was
justified under the remedial policies of section 7 06(g). 165
159. 104 S. Ct. at 2588.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. In an earlier footnote the Court held that the authority of a district court to
modify a consent decree was limited by Title VIII: "[A] district court cannot enter a
disputed modification of a consent decree . . . if the resulting order is inconsistent with
the statute." Id. at 2587 n. 9.
163. Id. at 2587 n. 9.
164. Id. at 2587.
165. Id. at 2588-89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) provides, in pertinent part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is inten-
tionally engaging in such unlawful employment practice charged in the com-
plaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmtive action as may be appropriate,
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without back pay. . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate. . . . No order of the court shall require the admission or rein-
statement of an individual as a member of a union or the hiring, reinstatement,
or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any
back pay, if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or
was refused employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for
206 [VOL. 45:179
LABOR LAW DECISIONS
As noted in the dissenting opinion, every court of appeals had
found the statute to support race-conscious affirmative relief in class
action litigation.' 66 The majority in Stotts, however, ignored those
cases, as well as the argument that such relief was contemplated by
the 1972 amendments, which authorized "any other equitable relief
as the court deems appropriate."'' 67 The majority said that victim-
specific remedies were "consistent with the policy behind section
706(g)," which was "to provide make whole relief only to those who
have been actual victims of illegal discrimination." 168 The majority
supported its interpretation by pointing to statements from the leg-
islative history that Title VII was not intended to authorize the use
of quotas or other specific remedies "for anyone who is not discrim-
inated against,"' 169 and that its primary purpose was "to make vic-
tims of unlawful discrimination whole."'
170
Mootness.-Commentators have debated whether the Court
seized upon Stotts as a vehicle for narrowing the Title VII remedial
power of the courts. The opinion itself is ambiguous, but it may be
significant that the Court even reached the issue. Noting that each
of the white employees adversely affected by the injunction had
been reinstated, the respondents, as well as the three dissenters,
urged that the case was moot. The majority disagreed, supporting
its decision with several curious assertions. First, the Court said that
the injunction (which it clearly assumed to be a final order) 17 was
still in effect and, unless reversed, would govern any future lay-
offs. 1 72 As the dissent pointed out, however, the effect of declaring
the controversy moot would have been to vacate the district court's
order and to return the parties to the status they occupied prior to
any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin or in violation of § 704(a) of this title."
166. 104 S. Ct. at 2606 n. 10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
167. Section 706(g) as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86
Stat. 107. As noted by the dissent, "as amended, the first sentence [of § 706(g)] autho-
rizes a court to order 'such affirmtive action as may be appropriate, which may include,
but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay. . . or
any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." (Emphasized language added by
amendments). 104 S. Ct. at 2609 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
168. 104 S. Ct. at 2588-89.
169. Id. at 2589.
170. Id. at 2590 n. 15.
171. Throughout its statement of the facts the Court referred to the district court's
order as an "injunction," not a preliminary injunction. Id. at 2579-82. Moreover, at one
point the Court called the order a "so-called preliminary injunction." Id. at 2583.
172. Id. at 2583.
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initiation of the lawsuit. ' 73 Moreover, the Court said that the prem-
ise of the "so-called preliminary injunction" was the district court's
ruling that the consent degree had to be modified to prevent a re-
duction of the percentage of black workers and that the city's senior-
ity system could be ignored. 74 Interestingly, the Court observed
that respondents had not conceded that these rulings were wrong,
but "to the contrary, they continue to defend them."'' 75 There is no
authority for the proposition that a party urging mootness must
concede the error of a lower court's decision. Nonetheless, the
Court asserted that the modified decree would continue to affect the
parties, not only in the event of another layoff, but because the city
would not be able to offer potential employees the benefit of its sen-
iority system.' 76 Finally, the Court asserted that even though the
laid off white employees had been reinstated, they continued to suf-
fer from loss of pay and seniority incurred during the layoff. 177
The Court seemed to separate the injunction from the modifi-
cation of the decree, implying that the latter would stand, even if the
injunction did not. 178 The majority, however, simply ignored the
dissent's assertion that a finding of mootness would vacate the lower
court's order, including its "rulings" and any modification imposed
as a result of the same case. Moreover, the dissent correctly as-
serted that nothing in the lower court's order prevented the city
from restoring pay or seniority to employees laid off as a result of
the injunction. 179 Nor was there any indication that the respondents
would oppose such action. As the dissenters observed, "[t]he opin-
ion today provides the city with a decision to insure that it can do
something that it has not claimed any interest in doing and has not
been prevented from doing, and that respondents concede that they
have no way of stopping."' 180
The mootness argument, then, seems compelling. Following
reinstatement of the laid off employees, the dispute between the city
173. Id. at 2597 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 2583.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2584.
178. "The inquiry is not merely whether the injunction is still in effect, but whether
the mandated modification of the consent decree continues to have an impact on the
parties such that the case remains alive." Id. at 2583.
179. Id. at 2598 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 2599 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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and the plaintiffs had ended. All workers were reinstated to the po-
sitions they had occupied prior to the strike. No court order pre-
vented the city from reimbursing white employees laid off pursuant
to the modified consent decree. While the union or the adversely
affected employees might have sought such recovery in litigation,
perhaps necessitating a ruling on the propriety of the district court's
decision, no such action was filed. What seemed to concern the
Supreme Court was the possibility that the district court's "rulings"
would guide its action in future layoffs, if any. No such controversy
faced the court, however. Vacation of the lower court's order would
simply have returned the parties to square one. By deciding the
merits, the Court rendered advice about how future lawsuits ought
to be decided, but had little effect on any actual dispute.
Discussion.- Because of the broad language used by the Court
to support its decision, reaction has run the gamut from predictions
that Stotts "sounds the death knell for affirmative action" to asser-
tions that the opinion offers "nothing new" at all.' 1 ' The latter view
maintains that the Court merely reasserted the importance of, and
the protection afforded to, bona fide seniority systems under section
703(h).' 82
There is no doubting the significance of section 703(h), nor the
influence it exerted on the Court's opinion. Indeed, one might well
assert that the policies underlying 703(h) alone would have pro-
vided ample support for the Court's decision in Stotts. Certainly, the
Court's reference to Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. 183 and Team-
sters v. United States, 184 two important decisions interpreting the stat-
ute, would lend credence to this view. The Court, however, did not
stop with section 703(h), but suggested in sweeping terms that the
remedial policies of section 706(g) restricted a lower court's author-
ity to order racially conscious class-based remedies and limited
power under Title VII to correction of wrongs suffered by identifi-
able victims of discrimination. It may be, as Justice Stevens
181. See Dispute Over Stotts Decision, 117 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 245 (Nov. 26, 1984)
(reporting comments of 0. Peter Sherwood, former assistant counsel for the NAACP
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.; William Robinson, executive director of the
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; and Assistant Attorney General William
Bradford Reynolds.)
182. Id. at 246. (This opinion was offered by William Robinson.)
183. 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (identifiable victims of post-Act discrimination are entitled
to grants of remedial seniority).
184. 431 U.S. 324 (1977) ("[A]n otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system does
not become unlawful under Title VII simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimi-
nation." Id. at 353-54. Section 703(h), therefore, shields the discriminatory effect of
pre-Act discrimination carried forward by seniority systems.)
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charged' 8 5 and other commentators have predicted,' 86 that the
Court's pronouncements were unnecessary to resolution of the case
and, therefore, only advisory. Moreover, it is certainly too early to
embrace the Reagan administration's position that class-based rem-
edies are pass6. It would be foolish, however, to disregard the tone
of the Court's opinion and pretend that Stotts does nothing more
than narrowly implement the policy of section 703(h). While advi-
sory it may be, the advice it gives is disturbing.
Although the significance of Stotts is a matter of some specula-
tion, some definite holdings emerge. Clearly, the inherent power of
courts to modify consent decrees is circumscribed by the reach of
Title VII. A court may not modify a preexisting bona fide seniority
system in order to fulfill the purposes of a decree affording affirma-
tive class-based relief. The further effect of the decision, however, is
uncertain. The Court said that constructive seniority could be
awarded only to proven victims of discrimination and broadly im-
plied that other class-based relief was also inappropriate.' 87 Both
assertions are curious.
Because Stotts involved the settlement of a Title VII lawsuit, it is
not surprising that no victims were identified. The Court heard no
evidence, and the city was probably unwilling to admit unlawful con-
duct in order to settle the case. If Stotts means that affirmative relief
is available only in the face of such admissions, it will significantly
undermine the incentive for either party to settle. Plaintiffs will be
185. 104 S. Ct. at 2594 (Stevens, J., concurring).
186. See, e.g., Hardin, supra note 1, at 304-06.
187. 104 S. Ct. at 2588, 2589. One commentator claimed that only Justice O'Connor
suggested that constructive seniority could be awarded "by specific findings after litiga-
tion by the specific identification of entitled victims through negotiation." See Hardin,
supra note 1, at 307. The author characterized Justice O'Connor's position as "errant
twaddle," id. at 308. Although the Court's opinion is ambiguous, Hardin's interpreta-
tion is not necessarily justified by the majority opinion:
Here, there was no finding that any of the blacks protected from layoff had
been a victim of discrimination and no award of competitive seniority to any of
them. Nor had the parties in formulating the consent decree purported to
identify any specific employee entitled to particular relief other than those
listed in the exhibits attached to the decree. It, therefore, seems to us that in
light of Teamsters, the Court of Appeals imposed on the parties as an adjunct of
settlement something that could not have been ordered had the case gone to
trial and the plaintiffs proved that a pattern or practice of discrimination
existed.
104 S. Ct. at 2588.
See also Miore Discussion of Stotts Ruling, 117 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 266, 267 (Dec. 3,
1984) ("Stotts creates a more complicated context for settlement," reporting comments
of Morgan Hodgson).
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unwilling to settle without guarantees of specific relief, and employ-
ers will be reluctant to admit actual wrongdoing.
Even more troubling is the Court's analysis of section 70 6 (g),
which seems to indicate that class-based relief is inappropriate.
Surely, a narrow reading of the case warrants no such conclusion.
The Court's analysis of the Act's remedial provisions was tempered
by section 703(h), which protects bona fide seniority systems. The
decision, then, may signify nothing more than that affirmative grants
of constructive seniority may be made only to actual victims of dis-
crimination and that class-based affirmative relief is not appropriate
to override the provisions of a bona fide seniority system. It does
not necessarily mean that other forms of class-based relief are inap-
propriate. In fact, the consent decree at issue in Stotts provided class
relief in the form of hiring and promotion goals. The Court did
nothing to disturb those remedies, although admittedly the issue
was not before it.
Given the narrowness of the issue in Stotts, the Reagan adminis-
tration's unbridled glee in the decision is probably notjustified. It is
not, as one official asserted, "the most significant civil rights vic-
tory"' in years, nor does it necessarily mean that only "victim-spe-
cific" relief is available through the courts.' 89 The tone of the
opinion, however, certainly cannot be ignored. The Court decided
a case that it might have avoided, and in doing so addressed the
policy of section 7 06(g) by quoting broadly from sources that ques-
tion the legality of goals and quotas.' Although the precise issue
in Stotts was narrower, the Court's discussion of class-based relief
was general and not expressly tied to the problems of bona fide sen-
iority systems. Moreover, the Court paid no heed to the plethora of
circuit court cases on point and seemed to disregard the remedial
significance of the 1972 amendments. It is not without risk, then,
that one dismisses the Stotts opinion as just one more victory for
seniority. Although its effect may be limited and its advice uncer-
tain, the rumblings in the opinion are ominous.9'
188. See Dispute Over Stotts Decision, supra note 181, at 245 (comments of William Brad-
ford Reynolds).
189. Id.
190. 104 S. Ct. at 2588-90.
191. The Reagan administration has given Stotts an expansive reading. For example,
the Department ofJustice has asked 50 state and local governments to modify consent
decrees containing race-conscious class-based relief. See Campaign Against Existing Consent
Decrees, 118 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 182, 182-83 (Mar. 11, 1985).
Some courts, however, have given it a narrow reading. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152, 1157-58 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3727
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One must also question what effect the attitudes expressed by
the majority in Stotts might ultimately have on voluntary affirmative
action. Even the Justice Department seems to concede that Steel-
workers v. Weber 192 escaped the Stotts decision unscathed.' 3 Cer-
tainly, whatever the import of the Court's comments about class-
based affirmative relief, the decision in Stotts involved court-imposed
remedies in the context of a court-approved settlement. Nothing in
the decision expressly questions the ability of the parties to fashion
voluntary plans that provide class-wide preferential treatment. It
bears noting, however, that the Court conceded nothing on volun-
tary affirmative action and, in fact, did not cite Weber at all. Near the
end of the opinion the Court acknowledged the Sixth Circuit's as-
sertion that the modified consent decree was proper because it or-
dered nothing that the city might not have done voluntarily.' 94 The
Court merely stated that the city had not done so and noted that
whether it "could have taken this course of action without violating
the law is an issue we need not decide." '195 Other portions of the
opinion allude to the possibility of voluntary agreement between the
plaintiffs and the city, but stop short of endorsing any such ac-
tion.196 Although the opinion would appear to be less threatening
to voluntary affirmative action than to other court-ordered relief,
the Court's vagueness was unnecessary (as was its verbosity on sec-
tion 7 06(g)) and is, therefore, disturbing. 197
(1985); NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 591 F. Supp. 1202-03, ( E.D. Mich.
1984); EEOC v. Local 638, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1466, 1467 (1985).
192. 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (Court rejected challenge to voluntary race-conscious af-
firmative action plan).
193. See, e.g., Dispute Over Stotts Decision, supra note 181, at 247 (reporting that Asst.
Attorney General Reynolds conceded that Weber "remains viable" but is an "exceed-
ingly narrow" decision).
194. 104 S. Ct. at 2590.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2586.
197. Recently, the Court granted review of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984). See 53 U.S.L.W. 3727 (1985). In
Vygant, the court of appeals upheld a voluntary race-conscious layoff plan negotiated
between a public employer and a union. The court said that the plan was valid, notwith-
standing the lack of any finding of prior discrimination. 746 F.2d at 1155. The court
distinguished Stotts, saying that it did not apply to voluntary affirmative action. Id. at
1158. The court also held that the plan's implementation was constitutional, id. at 1157,
an issue that it recognized the Court had not decided in Stotts. Id. at 1158. Obviously, in
Wlygant, the Court will not only have an opportunity to explain the effect of Stotts on race-
conscious relief, it will also reexamine JI'eber.
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B. Title VII and Partnership
In Hishon v. King & Spalding,"9 8 the Supreme Court decided a
case of significance to law firms, accounting firms, and other entities
doing business in the partnership form. In 1972, Elizabeth Hishon
accepted employment as an associate with King and Spalding, a
large Atlanta law firm composed of fifty partners who employed an-
other fifty attorneys as associates. In May 1978, the firm notified
Hishon that she would not be promoted to partner. One year later,
the firm ratified its previous decision, thereby not only denying
Hishon admission to the partnership but, in accordance with the
firm's "up or out" policy, terminating her employment as an associ-
ate as well.' 99 Hishon filed suit in federal district court, alleging that
King and Spaulding had discriminated against her on account of her
sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
district court dismissed the case, finding that Hishon's allegations
did not state a claim under Title VII. 20 A divided three-judge panel
for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.20 ' On certiorari, the Supreme
Court reversed, finding that consideration for partnership was
among the "terms, conditions or privileges" of Hishon's employ-
ment within the meaning of Title VII. 20 2
King and Spalding had resisted Hishon's claim by asserting that
the decision to invite an associate into the partnership was outside
the purview of Title VII since it changed an individual's status from
employee to employer. 20 ' The partners own the business, share
management decisions among themselves, and hire employees, in-
cluding associate attorneys, to workfor them. The firm argued that,
198. 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984).
199. Id. at 2232. The defendant claimed that it did not reconsider Hishon's case in
1979, but merely decided not to reconsider it. Therefore, defendant asserted that the
time within which a claim cold be filed (180 days, see 42 U.S.C. § 200e-5(e)) began to run
in 1978. Because the district court rejected Hishon's claim, it did not resolve the timeli-
ness issue. 104 S. Ct. at 2232 n. 1.
200. See 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1303 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
201. See 678 F.2d 1022 (11 th Cir. 1982).
202. 104 S. Ct. at 2233. Section 703(a)(1) provides that it is an "unlawful employ-
ment practice for an employer. . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin .. " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
The Court's decision was not entirely without precedent. In the only other re-
ported case concerning partnership discrimination, a district court reached the same
result on similar facts. See Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
353 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
203. 104 S. Ct. at 2235.
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while Title VII was intended to regulate the treatment afforded em-
ployees by employers, it was not designed to scrutinize relationships
between partner-employers themselves.20 4
The Court did not concede the legitimacy of King and Spald-
ing's argument, but found that consideration for partnership could
be a condition or privilege of an associate attorney's employment,
thus restricting its analysis to the employment perquisites of an indi-
vidual who was clearly an employee for purposes of the Civil Rights
Act:
[E]ven if respondent is correct that a partnership invitation
is not itself an offer of employment, Title VII would none-
theless apply and preclude discrimination on the basis of
sex. The benefit a plaintiff is denied need not be employ-
ment to fall within Title VII's protection; it need only be a
term, condition, or privilege of employment.20 5
Hishon alleged that the prospect of partnership was used as a
recruiting device by the firm and that the representations concern-
ing partnership were a significant factor in her decision to accept
employment. She claimed that the recruiters told her that associates
who "receive[d] satisfactory evaluations" were promoted to partner
within five or six years as "a matter of course" and that such deci-
sions were made on "a fair and equal basis."20 6 The Court found
the allegations of the complaint sufficient to state a claim that the
opportunity for partnership consideration was a part of Hishon's
employment contract. Since consideration for partnership was a
part of the contract, it was a term or privilege of employment within
the meaning of Title VII and, therefore could not be abridged for
reasons prohibited by the statute.20 7
The Court's decision was not so narrow, however, as to rest
entirely on the contract theory. The Court noted that employers
sometimes provide employees with benefits, even though not con-
tractually obligated to do so. 20 8 Although not employment rights,
such benefits are nonetheless "privileges" for purposes of Title VII:
"A benefit that is part and parcel of the employment relationship
204. Id.
205. Id. (emphasis in original).
206. Id. at 2232.
207. "If the evidence at trial establishes that the parties contracted to have petitioner
considered for partnership, that promise clearly was a term, condition, or privilege of
her employment. Title VII would then bind respondents to consider petitioner for part-
nership as the statute provides, i.e. without regard to [her] sex." Id. at 2234.
208. Id.
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may not be doled out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the em-
ployer would be free under the employment contract simply not to
provide the benefit at all." 209
The Court found Hishon's complaint sufficient to allege that
the opportunity for partnership consideration was "part and parcel
of an associate's status as an employee," whether or not guaranteed
by contract.2 '0 Thus, the Court noted the underlying allegations
that associates could expect to be considered for partnership at the
conclusion of their "apprenticeship"; that attorneys from outside
the firm were not regularly considered for partnership; that the pos-
sibility of becoming a partner was used by the firm as a recruiting
device; and that employment termination was the consequence of an
adverse partnership decision.2 t l Whether characterized as a con-
tract right or merely a privilege arising from associate status, consid-
eration for partnership was a term, condition, or privilege of
employment that could not be denied on a discriminatory basis.21 2
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell asserted that the
Court's decision "should not be read as extending Title VII to the
management of a law firm by its partners," pointing out that noth-
ing in the opinion justified the conclusion that the relationship be-
tween partners themselves was employment within the purview of
Title VII. 213 Powell's assertion is clearly correct as far as it goes:
the Court did not even consider whether partners are employees for
purposes of Title VII, since the "privilege of employment theory"
was sufficient to dispose of the case. Moreover, the Court's opinion
cannot fairly be read to mean that Title VII regulates relationships
between partners. However, the Court did not go as far as Justice
Powell and did not expressly acknowledge the inapplicability of
Title VII to partners as partners, thus leaving the question open.
The court of appeals had dealt with the issue directly. Before
the Eleventh Circuit, Hishon had contended that law firm partners
were "equivalent to 'employees' of a corporation thereby establish-
ing the employment context for Title VII's application. "214 The
court of appeals rejected this theory, although its opinion offers lit-
tle more than conclusions. For example, Hishon had cited Bellis v.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 2234-35. The Court also rejected the firm's claim that applying Title VII to
partnership decisions violated its constitutional right of expression or association. Id. at
2235.
213. Id. at 2236 (Powell, J., concurring).
214. 678 F.2d 1022, 1026 (11 th Cir. 1982).
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United States2 5 for the proposition that a partnership could have an
identity separate from its individual partners (presumably for the
purpose of showing that the partners could, therefore, be employ-
ees of a partnership). Without elaboration, the court merely said,
"[F]or many purposes, such as the fifth amendment's protection,
this 'separate identity' will yield results similar to those for corpora-
tions, but not for Title VII purposes.- 21 6 The real motivation be-
hind the Eleventh Circuit's decision was clear at the outset. In the
first paragraph of the opinion the court stated, "[W]e cannot over-
look the essence of a partnership-voluntary association. '21 7 The
court reiterated that theme often. Thus, in discussing whether part-
ners are employees under Title VII, the court said the partnership
"is clearly a voluntary association of lawyers .... The partners own
the partnership, they are not its 'employees' under Title
VII. . ."' Similarly, in rejecting the theory ultimately accepted
by the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit said, "[O]nce again, we
decline to extend the meaning of 'employment opportunities' be-
yond its intended context by encroaching upon individuals' deci-
sions to voluntarily associate in a business partnership. "219
On the surface, the Supreme Court's decision to reject the Elev-
enth Circuit's approach and find partnership consideration an "em-
ployment opportunity" subject to Title VII is not difficult to
understand. Firms that explicitly or impliedly promise partnership
as an inducement to prospective employees must not base selection
decisions on criteria prohibited by Title VII. The opinion, however,
does raise interesting questions, particularly with regard to the issue
reserved by the Court-the applicability of Title VII to relations be-
tween partners themselves.
Assuming that Justice Powell and the Eleventh Circuit are cor-
rect (i.e., that Title VII does not apply to partners in voluntary asso-
ciation), the reach of the opinion in Hishon might be seen as limited
to cases involving similarly specific allegations as to the linkage be-
tween associate status and partnership consideration. For example,
it is certainly not true that associates in all large firms can expect
promotion to partnership as "a matter of course." In some firms,
for example, the partnership resembles a pyramid, with relatively
215. 417 U.S. 85 (1974), cited at 678 F.2d at 1026.
216. 678 F.2d at 1026.
217. Id. at 1024.
218. Id. at 1028.
219. Id.
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few partners and large numbers of presumably well-qualified associ-
ates.22 0 In such firms, it may be difficult for associates to establish
that partnership prospects were used as an inducement in recruiting
or that express promises of partnership consideration were made.
Moreover, it may be that associates in such firms are not routinely
considered for partnership and have no legitimate expectation of
such action, thereby negating a claim that partnership consideration
is "part and parcel of an associate's status" regardless of any con-
tractual commitment.22 ' Finally, the linkage between associate sta-
tus and partnership consideration referred to by the Court 22 2 might
be discounted by proof that individuals other than associates are
sometimes considered for the partnership. 223
Even in firms in which relatively few associates can expect to
become partners, however, it is likely that they are led to believe
that they will at least be considered as potential partners. Although
Hishon does not mandate an affirmative decision, it at least insures
nondiscriminatory consideration. Associates cannot be rejected for
reasons prohibited by Title VII. To that extent, Hishon may well
work changes in the selection process for firms that choose their
partners from groups of seasoned, competent associates.
For example, a firm may decide to "make" only one partner
from a class of several eligible associates. Presumably, any associate
who has remained with the firm long enough to face the partnership
decision (a period as long as eight or ten years in some firms) will
have demonstrated sufficient legal skills for partnership considera-
tion. Consequently, such partnership decisions are sometimes
based on more subjective criteria, such as the firm's perception of
an associate as a potential leader or business-getter. 22 4 Those at-
tributes may be related to social or professional affiliations not regu-
larly available to blacks or women. Until recently, for example, the
Jaycees systematically excluded women.225 Similarly, country club
220. See, e.g., The NLJ 250, A Special 5-Year Report on the Dramatic Growth of the Nations
Largest Law Firms, Nat'l LJ. (Sept. 19, 1983) (special anniversary section).
221. See, e.g., E. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER 74-90 (1969).
222. 104 S. Ct. at 2234.
223. See, e.g., E. SMIGEL, supra note 221, at 42, 90 (discussion of law firm practice of
selecting famous lawyers or well-known government figures to automatic partnership
status).
224. See, e.g., id. at 97-110.
225. See Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984) (application of Title
VII to compel respondents to admit women as regular members did not abridge either
male members' freedom of expressive association or freedom of intimate association).
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membership is often restricted by race. Yet it may be that an associ-
ate's potential for civic, business, or political contacts originates
through membership in such organizations. Clearly, then, the use
of such criteria in making partnership decisions raises the possibility
that minorities and women will be adversely affected. Although the
effect of using such subjective criteria is unclear, the potential for a
discriminatory effect at least raises the possibility of a claim under
adverse impact analysis.
Even more intriguing is speculation about the question the
Court reserved, namely the application of Title VII to relationships
between partners. In its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit declared that
"the very essence of a partnership is the voluntary joinder of all
partners" who own the business. 226 There is nothing controversial
about the Court's opinion as it applies to the decision of two or
more people to pool their resources and abilities and to accept the
risks and rewards of a joint business venture. That account no
doubt describes many law firms. It certainly does not describe them
all.
Generalization about law firm organization is difficult (and
probably dangerous) not only because of the myriad partnership ar-
rangements, but also because of the secrecy that surrounds partner-
ship agreements.227 In Hishon, for example, King and Spalding
supplied in discovery only an edited copy of its partnership agree-
ment, which was placed under seal (the Eleventh Circuit described it
as "particularly sensitive") and not made available to the EEOC. 2
Even though Justice Powell characterized law partnerships as "the
common conduct of a shared enterprise, "229 that generalization cer-
tainly does not capture all partnership arrangements. It is certainly
not true, for example, that all law firm partnerships are comprised
of lawyers who share equally in compensation, risk of loss, and firm
governance.230 In some firms the "partnership" may, in fact, en-
compass several levels of participation, depending on such factors
as years of service, income production, and business generation.
New partners may be little more than profit sharing associates, who
accept little risk (and probably little profit) and who have little, if
226. 678 F.2d at 1028.
227. See, e.g., SMIGEL, supra note 221, at 210-15.
228. 678 F.2d at 1025, 1025 n.6.
229. 104 S.Ct. at 2236.
230. See, e.g., SMIGEL, supra iote 221, at 183, 228; P. HOFFMAN, LIONS IN THE STREET
57-60 (1973).
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any, voice in the governance of the firm. 231' Although higher level
partners, who manage the firm and shoulder most of the risks of the
venture, may resemble owners more than employees, lower level
partners may not. Using the "economic realities" test alluded to by
the Eleventh Circuit in Hishon,2 32 such partners may have many of
the attributes of "employees" for purposes of Title VII. They are
unable to exert significant influence on the management of the firm,
including, perhaps, such matters as their own compensation and
work assignments.23 Instead, they must wait to be elevated to a
higher level within the partnership, a process no doubt comparable
to a promotion in a typical employment relationship.
For the purposes of Title VII, the consequences of finding a
mid-level class of employee-partners are two-fold. First, this analy-
sis strengthens the claim that consideration for partnership is an
employment opportunity within the firm, i.e., promotion to a more
lucrative employment position. Second, and more importantly, it
raises the possibility that simply designating attorneys as "part-
ners," and assigning them microscopic shares of the profits, does
not necessarily terminate coverage of Title VII. If such partners are
viewed as employees for purposes of Title VII, any benefit or privi-
lege afforded them-including "promotion" to a higher level part-
nership-would be subject to scrutiny.
Certainly, there is no authority for extending coverage of Title
VII to relationships between partners. The Supreme Court's opin-
ion merely says that the opportunity to be considered for partnership
may be a privilege of an associate's employment. Moreover, both
the Eleventh Circuit and Justice Powell offered opinions flatly as-
serting that Title VII has no role to play in law firm partnerships.
Both of those opinions, however, are replete with conclusions and
assumptions about the structure of law firms that are not valid in all
cases. One must remember that the traditional notions of voluntary
association and freedom to choose business partners were not suffi-
cient to convince the Court that King and Spalding could select
partners free from the constraints of Title VII. If the partnership
decision itself is not sacrosanct, it is possible that the Court would
tolerate an analysis that asks whether partnership may really be em-
ployment for purposes of Title VII.
231. See, e.g., SMIGEL, supra note 221, at 228.
232. 678 F.2d at 1027 n. 9. The test stems from NLRB v. Hearst Publications Co.,
322 U.S. 111 (1944), in which the Court sought to determine employee status by looking
to the "economic realities" of the employment relationship.
233. See, e.g., SMIGEL, supra note 221, at 183, 228, 239-44.
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C. Involuntary Retirement and the ADEA
The reasoning of Hishon influenced the Court in an age discrim-
ination case handed down during the 1984 term. In TWA v. Thur-
ston,234 the Court considered an airline's policy of allowing pilots
disabled for reasons other than age to bump less senior flight engi-
neers, while at the same time requiring pilots disqualified because of
age to bid for a flight engineer vacancy.
The controversy arose because the collective bargaining agree-
ment between TWA and the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) re-
quired both pilots and flight engineers to retire at age sixty. 23 5 At
least as to pilots, the policy was apparently influenced by an FAA
regulation. 3 6 At the time of the agreement in 1977, the retirement
policy qualified as a bona fide seniority system and was lawful under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) despite its im-
pact on employees in the protected age group.23 7 The Act, how-
ever, was amended in 1978 to prohibit involuntary retirement of
protected employees on account of age.23 8
In response to the amendments TWA announced, over union
opposition, that it would ignore contract provisions requiring
mandatory retirement of flight engineers. 23 9 The company also
proposed that retiring pilots be allowed to transfer to the position of
flight engineer and to continue working after reaching age sixty. 240
Bowing to resistance from the ALPA, the company modified its plan
to permit aging pilots to bid for the job of flight engineer under
procedures existing in the collective bargaining agreement.2 4' The
234. 105 S. Ct. 613 (1985).
235. 105 S. Ct. at 618.
236. Id. at 618 n.3. The FAA regulation, 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c), draws a distinction
between captains and first officers, who are defined as "pilots," and flight engineers,
who are not considered "pilots."
237. The ADEA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34, was effective in 1968. As originally enacted, it
protected employees age 40 to 65. Section 4(f) of the original act, codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(f)(2), provided that it was not unlawful "[t]o observe the terms of a bona fide
seniority system or any bona fide employee benefit plan such as retirement, pension or
insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purpose this Act."
238. The amendments added the following to the language quoted, supra note 237:
"and no such seniority system or employee benefit plan shall require or permit the in-
voluntary retirement of any individual . . . because of the age of such individual." See
29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2).
239. 105 S. Ct. at 619.
240. Id.
241. Id. The union protested the company's action by filing suit under the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 156-188, contending that the modification was "a unilateral
change in working conditions." The employer prevailed in both the district court and
the court of appeals. 105 S. Ct. at 619 n. 5.
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revised plan permitted any pilot approaching mandatory retirement
to submit a "standing bid." If a flight engineer vacancy occurred,
the most senior bidding employee would get the job.242 Subse-
quently, the plan was amended to require that the job be filled when
the vacancy occurred, thereby forcing some pilots to choose be-
tween accepting the lower paying flight engineer position prior to
age sixty, or declining with the hope that another vacancy would
occur before retirement.243 The company's plan gave retiring pilots
no assurance of continued employment. Thus, if no vacancy oc-
curred after filing the bid, or if the pilot lacked enough seniority to
secure a flight engineer position, the pilot was forced to retire at age
sixty.2 4
4
This practice differed significantly from the treatment afforded
pilots who were unable to fly for reasons unrelated to age. For ex-
ample, pilots who were medically disqualified or whose position had
been eliminated-and even pilots who were incompetent-were
permitted to "bump" less senior flight engineers and therefore con-
tinue working.245 Moreover, even if such pilots lacked sufficient
seniority to displace another employee, their employment was not
terminated, as happened to sixty-year-old pilots unable to secure
another job. Rather, they were placed on leave and continued to
accrue seniority, thereby entitling them to recall when a vacancy oc-
curred in a position for which they were qualified.2" 6
Relying expressly on its opinion in Hishon,2 4 7 a unanimous
Court found that TWA's transfer policies denied sixty-year-old pi-
lots a "privilege of employment on the basis of age," holding that
"[t]he Act does not require TWA to grant transfer privileges to
disqualified captains. Nevertheless, if TWA does grant some dis-
qualified captains the 'privilege' of 'bumping' less senior flight engi-
neers, it may not deny this opportunity to others because of their
age."-
24 8
The Court rejected TWA's assertion, approved by the district
242. Id. at 619.
243. Id. at 619 n. 7.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 619 nn. 9 & 10.
247. 104 S. Ct. at 2229 (1984). See supra notes 198-233 and accompanying text.
248. 105 S. Ct. at 621. The plaintiffs also filed an action against the APLA. The court
of appeals upheld a violation, but found that the union was not liable for damages since
it interpreted the Act as not permitting the recovery of damages against unions. The
Supreme Court decided that it was without jurisdiction to consider the matter. Id. at
620-21 n.14.
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court, that the plaintiffs' burden was controlled by McDonnell Douglas
v. Green, 249 and that plaintiffs' claims failed because they had been
unable to show that a vacancy existed in the position of flight engi-
neer at the time of their forced retirement.250 The Court said that
the McDonnell Douglas test did not apply since the plaintiffs had mar-
shalled direct evidence of discrimination. 25 1 By contrast, McDonnell
Douglas was "designed to assure that the 'plaintiff [has] his day in
court despite the unavailability of direct evidence.' "252
The Court also rejected two affirmative defenses mounted by
the employer. First, TWA contended that forced retirement of pi-
lots at age sixty or older was not at issue, claiming that age was a
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for the captain's posi-
tion. 25" The Court, however, noted that the airlines policy of refus-
ing to employ pilots age sixty and older was not an issue. Rather,
the Court was concerned with TWA's practice of refusing to allow
age-disqualified captains the same transfer rights available to other
disqualified captains. 25' That policy did not exclude individuals
from the position of pilot. Instead, it prevented certain pilots from
249. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas, the Court said that a plaintiff estab-
lished a prima facie case of discrimination by showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied for and was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802.
250. 105 S. Ct. at 622.
251. Id.
252. Id. (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979)). The
court of appeals discussion of the McDonnell Douglas theory was more extensive. The
court pointed out that the criteria of McDonnell Douglas allow a plaintiff to establish a
discriminatory motive, despite the absence of direct evidence. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v.
TWA, 713 F.2d 940, 951-52 (2d Cir. 1983). The court of appeals did take note, how-
ever, of statements by the Supreme Court indicating that McDonnell Douglas is "not nec-
essarily applicable in every respect," 713 F.2d at 952 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411
U.S. at 803, n. 13), and that it is not an "inflexible rule" (quoting Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575 (1978)). The court also referred to one of its own
opinions indicating that the McDonnell Douglas criteria are not "exclusive" and need not
be adhered to "stubbornly ...when common sense dictates the same result on the
basis of alternative formulae." 713 F.2d at 952 (quoting Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
635 F.2d 1007, 1014 (2d Cir. 1983)). The court concluded that McDonnell Douglas does
not bar a plaintiff from establishing a prima facia case by other means and that direct
evidence of disparate treatment produced by the plaintiffs is sufficient. 713 F.2d at 952.
253. 105 S. Ct. at 622-23. Section 4(f)(1), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(0)(1), provides
that it is not unlawful "to take any action otherwise prohibited... where age is a bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the par-
ticular business."
254. 105 S. Ct. at 622-23.
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working as flight engineers solely because of their age: "[I]t is the
'particular' job of flight engineer from which the respondents were
excluded by the discriminatory transfer policy. Because age under
60 is not a BFOQ for the position of flight engineer, the age-based
discrimination at issue in this case cannot be justified by §4(0(1) [of
the ADEA]. '255 The Court concluded that the ADEA allowed TWA
to retire, or discharge, all disqualified captains, irrespective of their
age.256 The statute does not, however, authorize age discriminatory
transfer policies, even if age is a bona fide occupational qualification
for the employee's former position.257
The Court made short work of the employer's second affirma-
tive defense. Relying on section 4(f)(2),258 the employer claimed
that its transfer policy was justified as part of a "bona fide seniority
system. ' 259 However, that section provides expressly that no such
bona fide plan could permit "the involuntary retirement of a pro-
tected individual. . .because of age."-2 60 Because TWA's plan per-
mitted discriminatory age-based involuntary retirement, the
affirmative defense of a bona fide seniority plan was
"unavailable.' '261
Having found TWA in violation of the Act, the Court then ad-
dressed the plaintiffs' contention that they were entitled to double-
back pay pursuant to section 7(b) of the ADEA, which authorizes
such awards in cases of "willful violations. '262 The statute, which
provides for enforcement "in accordance with the powers, reme-
dies, and procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act," (FLSA) does
not define "willful."'2 6 ' The Court, however, relied on cases inter-
preting willfulness for purposes of imposing criminal penalities
under the FLSA and agreed with the court of appeals' conclusion
that a violation was willful if "the employer . . .knew or showed
reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohib-
ited. ' '264 In adopting the "reckless disregard" standard, the Court
255. Id.
256. Id. at 623.
257. Id.
258. 29 U.S.C. § 623()(2).
259. 105 S. Ct. at 623.
260. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2).
261. 105 S. Ct. at 623.
262. Section 7(b) of the ADEA, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), states that "[t]he provi-
sions of this Act shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and proce-
dures . .. [in the Fair Labor Standards Act] . .. Provided, that liquidated damages
shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of this Act."
263. Id.
264. 105 S. Ct. at 624 (quoting Airline Pilots Ass'n v. TWA, 713 F.2d at 956).
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rejected TWA's claim that intent to violate the statute was essen-
tial .165 It also rejected the so-called "in the picture" standard, advo-
cated by the plaintiffs, which would have found an employer's
conduct to be willful if the employer had notice of the "potential
applicability" of the Act. 266 The Court concluded that Congress did
not intend to punish employers who acted reasonably and in good
faith. Those requirements were satisfied by TWA, which had sought
legal advice, consulted with the union and, ultimately, adopted a
plan that it thought satisfied the obligations of both the law and its
collective bargaining agreement with the union.2 6 7
Although the case is interesting, the Court's decision should
not provoke great controversy. The Court's holding on the under-
lying discrimination issue is clearly correct: TWA's "bumping" pol-
icy treated pilots disqualified for age differently from those
disqualified for any other reason. As such, certain pilots were de-
nied a privilege of employment available to other workers, solely
because of their age. Moreover, no bona fide occupational reason
prevented age disqualified pilots from working as flight engineers, a
conclusion supported by the fact that TWA employed at least 148
flight engineers who were more than sixty years old.268
The Court also properly held, though it should not have had to,
that plaintiffs did not have to satisfy the McDonnell-Douglas criteria.
The district court's wooden application of those criteria may not
have been unusual, but it was clearly wrong. 269 The district court
had held that plaintiffs' cases failed even though they could show
that they were members of the protected age group, that they were
discharged, and that they were qualified for the position of flight
engineer. They failed to satisfy McDonnell Douglas, however, because
they could not show that a flight engineer's vacancy existed at the
time of their forced retirements.27 ° Presumably, even casual analy-
sis would have demonstrated the peculiar anomaly created by the
court's interpretation. Thus, under the district court's analysis, the
plaintiffs would have had to show that a flight engineer's job was
open at the time of their termination, while the basis of their claim
was that they were discharged because no job was available due to
the petitioner's discriminatory bumping policy. Fortunately, the
265. 105 S. Ct. at 624.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 626.
268. Id. at 623 n. 18.
269. See, e.g., Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1185-87 (4th Cir. 1982).
270. 713 F.2d at 952.
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Supreme Court made explicit what should already have been obvi-
ous: McDonnell Douglas was intended to protect plaintiffs who have
no direct evidence of discrimination. It was not intended to deny
plaintiffs the opportunity to submit express evidence of discrimina-
tory employment practices.
The Court's interpretation of the ADEA's liquidated damages
provision was less obvious but, nonetheless, appropriate. The
plaintiffs had argued for an "in the picture" standard, partly because
of an interpretation of a statute of limitations provision in the Portal
to Portal Act, which is incorporated in the ADEA.27 t Section 6 of
the Portal to Portal Act 27 2 provides a general two-year statute of lim-
itations for lawsuits brought under the ADEA, which is increased to
three years in the case of a willful violation.273 Some courts of ap-
peals have held that the willfulness requirement of section 6 is satis-
fied if the employer was merely aware that the ADEA might be
applicable.274 Without expressly approving that test, the Court de-
termined that it could not, in any event, apply to the liquidated dam-
ages provision. Since employers are required to post notices
concerning the ADEA, the result of an "in the picture" standard
would be an award of double damages in almost every case.275 Such
a result would nullify the obvious intention of Congress to employ
liquidated damages as a punitive measure.2 7 6 Thus, the Court's de-
cision to shield employers who have acted reasonably and in good
faith, and to punish only those who have acted knowingly or reck-
lessly, is in accord with the clear purpose of the legislation.
D. The "Clearly Erroneous" Standard of Rule 52(a)
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, North Carolina2 7 7 arose under Ti-
tle VII, but involves no significant interpretation of that statute. In-
stead, the Court used Anderson as a vehicle for limiting the authority
of appellate courts to overrule the factual findings of trial judges.
271. See ADEA, § 7(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(1), which states simply that "sections
255 and 259 of this title shall apply to actions under this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 255(a),
in pertinent part, prolvides that "every such action shall be forever barred unless com-
menced within two years after the cause of action accrued, except that a cause of action
arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years after the cause of
action accrued."
272. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).
273. Id.
274. See, e.g., Coleman v. JiffyJune Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d 1139, 1142 (5th Cir. 1971);
EEOC v. Central Kansas Medical Center, 705 F.2d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 1983).
275. 105 S. Ct. at 625.
276. Id.
277. 105 S. Ct. 1504 (1985).
1986] 225
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Nonetheless, because there is no right to a jury trial in Title VII
cases, Anderson should be of interest to labor lawyers who prosecute
or defend such actions.
The plaintiff had charged the city with unlawful sex discrimina-
tion for rejecting her application for the position of recreation direc-
tor in favor of a male applicant.278 The district court sustained her
claim, finding that: (1) the plaintiff was better qualified than the
man who got the job; (2) the male members on the selection com-
mittee had shown a bias against women;279 and, (3) the reasons of-
fered to support their selection of the male candidate were
pretextual. 2 0  The Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that all
three factual findings were clearly erroneous, pursuant to the stan-
dard established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). 28 '
The court of appeals acknowledged that it had subjected the
district court's findings to "close scrutiny. "282 Heightened scrutiny
was justified, the court asserted, because the trial court had solicited
findings of fact and conclusions of law from plaintiff's counsel, a
practice the Fourth Circuit had previously criticized.28 3 The
Supreme Court acknowledged that verbatim adoption of the pre-
vailing party's findings of fact had "the potential for overreaching
and exaggeration" and noted that, like the Fourth Circuit, it had
criticized courts for following that procedure.28 4 In Anderson, how-
ever, the lower court had provided defendant's counsel an opportu-
nity to comment on the proposed findings, and the findings
ultimately issued by the court varied "considerably in organization
and content" from those offered by the plaintiff.28 5 As such, the
Supreme Court was confident that the findings of fact "repre-
sent[ed] the judge's own considered conclusions. ' 28 6 Even a verba-
tim adoption of the plaintiff's proposed findings, however, would
278. Id. at 1508.
279. Id. Four of the five members of the selection committee were men.
280. Id. at 1509-10.
281. Id. at 1511. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) provides that "[flindings of fact shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses."
In 1982, the Supreme Court held that a finding of discriminatory intent in a Title
VII action is a factual finding subject to Rule 52(a). See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456
U.S. 273, 293 (1982).
282. 717 F.2d 149, 156 (4th Cir. 1983).
283. See Chicopee Mfg. Corp. v. Kendall Co., 288 F.2d 719, 724-25 (4th Cir. 1951);
Cuthbertson v. Biggers Bros., Inc., 702 F.2d 454, 465 (4th Cir. 1983).
284. 105 S. Ct. at 1511.
285. Id. The Court also said that the proposed findings were prepared by the plaintiff
in accordance with guidelines set forth by the district court.
286. Id.
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have been reviewable only under the "clearly erroneous" standard
since, upon adoption, they become the findings of the court. 287
On the merits, the court of appeals disagreed expressly with
several findings of the district court. For example, the trial judge
had found that the position of recreation director encompassed not
only management of athletic programs, but development of other
activities as well.288 The Fourth Circuit, however, interpreted the
same evidence to mean that implementation of an athletic program
was the job's primary responsibility.289 Moreover, the court of ap-
peals rejected the district court's finding that Anderson was the bet-
ter qualified applicant. 290 Again, construing the same evidence
presented to the trial court, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the
successful applicant's "overall training was superior to [plaintiff's]
training and experience for the demands of this job. ' 29 ' The court
of appeals also disagreed with the district court's finding that only
the plaintiff had been asked questions concerning the potential im-
pact of the job on her family, a factor the trial court used in conclud-
ing that the committee was biased against women.292 Even though
the latter finding depended, in part, on credibility determinations,
the Fourth Circuit reversed the trial court, construing the evidence
to mean that other applicants had been asked the same questions. 293
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision,
stating unambiguously that appellate courts are not free to discard
factual findings with which they disagree.294 They may reverse only
findings that are "clearly erroneous. ' ' 295 Rule 52, the Court said,
does not entitle reviewing courts "to decide factual issues de novo";
rather, the appellate court's function is to determine whether the
findings of fact are wrong.296 Although both the Supreme Court
and the Fourth Circuit applied the same definition of "clearly erro-
neous," 297 the Anderson opinion makes clear that the relevant inquiry
is the plausibility of the district court's findings:
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1513.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. 717 F.2d at 154.
292. 105 S. Ct. at 1513-14.
293. 717 F.2d at 155.
294. 105 S. Ct. at 1512.
295. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). See text accompanying note 281.
296. 105 S. Ct. at 1512.
297. Id. at 1511; 717 F.2d at 154. Both courts looked to the opinion in United States
v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) for the following explanation of the
"clearly erroneous" standard: "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is
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If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in
light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of ap-
peals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it
been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the
evidence differently. Where there are two permissible
views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them
cannot be clearly erroneous.29 8
The Court noted that when a trial court's factual findings are
based on credibility determinations, the role of the appellate court
is particuarly circumscribed. 299 Although a court might reverse a
factual finding when a witness' testimony is contradicted by "docu-
mentary or objective evidence," a decision by a trial court to dis-
credit one of two or more witnesses "can virtually never be clear
error."
300
Even when credibility is not at issue, however, the Court indi-
cated that reviewing courts must accept factual findings that are not
clearly wrong. Prior to Anderson, some courts of appeals had as-
serted that they need not defer to findings based on physical or doc-
umentary evidence, presumably because appellate courts can read
documents and examine physical evidence as well as trial judges.A0
The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the trial court's superi-
ority is not limited to determinations of credibility: "The trial
judge's major role is the determination of fact, and with experience
in fulfilling that role comes expertise. "302
Anderson may not be a momentous decision, but it was a neces-
sary one. Even a cursory review of the Fourth Circuit's action dis-
closes the scant regard it had for the trial court's work. The Fourth
Circuit simply ignored the findings of the trial judge and conducted
its own thorough review of the evidence. In effect, the trial judge
was little more than a hearing examiner who passed on the admissi-
bility of evidence and made recommendations which the appellate
judges were free to reject. Indeed, even the trial court's credibility
determination was rejected as "clearly erroneous. ' 30 3 The Supreme
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Id. at 395.
298. 105 S. Ct. at 1512 (United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 342 (1949);
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844 (1982)).
299. 105 S. Ct. at 1512. The Court also noted that district courts cannot insulate their
findings from review by "denominating them credibility determinations" when they are
not. Id.
300. Id. at 1512-13.
301. Id. at 1512.
302. Id.
303. 717 F.2d at 155.
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Court's opinion properly limits the appellate court's function to a
review, not a retrial, of the district court's factual findings. The par-
ties had already tried the case once, and "[r]equiring them to per-
suade three more judges at the appellate level is requiring too
much."
30 4
III. DUE PROCESS FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
A recurring problem in public employment law has been
whether the due process clause mandates a hearing before an em-
ployee's discharge. In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,30 5
the Supreme Court acknowledged, as it had before,3" 6 that some
public employees have a constitutionally protected property interest
in their jobs. Such employees, the Court held, cannot be deprived
of their jobs without due process of law, which includes a
pretermination hearing. 307 The "hearing," however, need not be
elaborate and, in fact, amounts to little more than an opportunity
for the employee to respond to charges. 0 8
The case arose out of the discharge of two employees of Ohio
school districts. Although each had civil service protection entitling
him to a posttermination hearing and appeal, state law imposed no
predischarge procedure or requirements. Indeed, both complaints
(filed in federal district court) alleged the unconstitutionality of the
Ohio statute on the grounds that it did not provide employees an
opportunity to respond to the charges against them prior to termi-
nation.30 9 The district court dismissed both cases for failure to state
a claim, reasoning that because the Ohio statutes created the prop-
erty right in employment, the legislature could also limit the proce-
dures employed to enforce that right.310 Subsequently, the trial
court abandoned that rationale, instead basing its decision on a bal-
ancing test.3 1 ' The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the interests
of the employees outweighed the state's interest in avoiding a pre-
termination hearing.3 1 2
Fundamental to the constitutional issue was the question of
whether the employees even had a protected property interest in
304. 105 S. Ct. at 1512.
305. 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).
306. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
307. 105 S. Ct. at 1495.
308. Id. at 1490.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 1491 n. 2.
312. 721 F.2d 550, 562 (6th Cir. 1983).
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their jobs. Under Ohio law, classified civil service employees could
be discharged only for "misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance
in office." 3 3 The Court had recognized previously that employees
entitled to continued employment under state law have constitu-
tionally protected property rights. One of the petitioners, however,
finding support in the plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 314 ar-
gued that the scope of the employees' substantive right was limited
by the procedures provided by statute for its enforcement."1 5
In Arnett, the Court denied the claim of a federal employee who
argued that the failure to provide him with a predischarge hearing
violated his right to due process of law.316 Three Justices (Rehn-
quist, Burger, and Stewart) thought that any expectancy of job re-
tention was limited by statutory procedures for contesting a
discharge:3
17
The employee's statutorily defined right is not a guarantee
against removal without cause in the abstract, but such a
guarantee as enforced by the procedures which Congress
has designated for the determination of cause.
[W]here the grant of a substantive right is inextricably in-
tertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are
to be employed in determining that right, a litigant in the
position of appellee must take the bitter with the sweet. 18
The Court, noting that two of its more recent decisions had ques-
tioned the Arnett plurality's view,31 9 abandoned it outright in
Loudermill. It acknowledged that public employers are not required
313. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 124.34 (1984), pertinent portions quoted in 105 S. Ct. at
1491 n.4.
314. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
315. 105 S. Ct. at 1492.
316. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
317. Id. at 151. The statute in question, 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a)-(b), provided for a post
termination hearing.
318. 416 U.S. at 152, 153-54. The two otherJustices comprising the majority (Powell
and Blackmun) concurred in the judgment, but disagreed with the plurality's conclusion
that the employee had no property right in his job. However, they believed that, on
balance, a posttermination hearing sufficiently protected the employee's interests. Id. at
164-71.
319. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (involuntary transfer of prisoner to
mental hospital is deprivation of a liberty interest necessitating appropriate procedural
safeguards, including notice and a hearing); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S.
422 (1980) (right to assert job discrimination claim through the Federal Employment
Practices Commission is a protected property interest that cannot be deprived without
some form of hearing). Both of these decisions are discussed in Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. at
1492-93.
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by the Constitution to create a property interest in continued em-
ployment.32 If they do, however, the substantive right cannot be
limited by procedures falling short of fifth and fourteenth amend-
ment guarantees: "The Due Process Clause provides that certain
substantive rights-life, liberty, and property-cannot be deprived
except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures." 3 '
Having found that tenured employees may not be deprived of
their employment without due process of law, the Court then turned
to the procedures mandated by the Constitution. The Court read
prior decisions to require "some kind of a hearing" prior to termi-
nation,3 2 2 a process also warranted by a balancing of the parties'
interests.323 From the employees' side, the Court noted the impor-
tance to workers of retaining employment and the difficulty of secur-
ing new work after having been discharged. 24 It also asserted that
employees have an interest in presenting their side of the story
before termination, since that might be "the only meaningful oppor-
tunity to invoke the discretion of the decisionmaker. ' '3 25 The em-
ployers' interests were found to be less significant. A
pretermination hearing would not necessarily either impose an ad-
ministrative burden or result in inordinate delay.126 Moreover, em-
ployers shared the employees' interest in avoiding an erroneous
decision, a prospect that could be minimized by a pretermination
hearing.327 The Court also announced that public employers would
rather keep qualified employees than train new ones and that gov-
ernmental units have an interest in providing employment to citi-
zens, "rather than taking the possibly erroneous and counter-
productive step of forcing its employees onto the welfare roles. "328
The latter two interests appear to be little more than makeweight
arguments. Certainly, neither employer advanced either interest in
this case. The Court would have been better off merely stating the
real reason for its decision: The employer's interest in controlling
320. 105 S. Ct. at 1487 (quoting Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Arnett, 416
U.S. at 167) ("While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in [pub-
lic] employment, it may not constitutionally authorize a deprivation of such an interest,
once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards.")
321. 105 S. Ct. at 1493.
322. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-570 (1972); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972).
323. 105 S. Ct. at 1494.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 1495.
327. Id.
328. Id.
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its work force does not outweigh an employee's interest in respond-
ing to charges.
The government's interest in speed, however, was sufficient to
affect the formality of the requisite predischarge proceeding.
Although a pretermination hearing is a constitutional necessity, the
"hearing" itself amounts to little more than notice with an opportu-
nity to respond.3 29 The Constitution, the Court decided, does not
require a full evidentiary trial. Moreover, the hearing need not re-
solve the dispute. Rather, the procedure is merely "an initial check
against mistaken decisions-essentially, a determination of whether
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the
employee are true and support the proposed action." 33 0
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan claimed that the
Court's decision was limited to cases in which there is no factual
dispute, and that under certain circumstances due process might re-
quire more. The issues decided by the Court in Loudermill involved
no contested facts, but only "plausible arguments [by the employ-
ees] that might have prevented their discharge." '33 ' Brennan urged
that when facts alleged in support of the discharge are in dispute,
"an employee may deserve a fair opportunity before discharge to
produce contrary records or testimony, or even to confront an ac-
cuser in front of the decisionmaker. '
3 32
Although the Court in Loudermill was not faced with disputed
facts, Brennan's attempted distinction is not persuasive. The Court
did not limit its discussion to the formalities required in the case
before it, but spoke generally concerning public employment:
The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written
notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the
employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his
side of the story. . . . To require more than this prior to
termination would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the
government's interest in quickly removing an unsatisfac-
tory employee. 3
Nothing in the opinion justifies the conclusion that these re-
quirements might be extended in factually contested cases. The de-
cision seems clearly to require little more than a prima facie
determination of cause, with controverted matters left for resolution
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 1499 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1495-96 (citations omitted).
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in postdischarge proceedings. Indeed, the Court noted that it had
required a full evidentiary proceeding prior to adverse governmental
action only in a case involving the termination of welfare benefits. 34
In that case, the Court noted that termination could deprive a recip-
ient of the means necessary to sustain life while waiting for a post-
termination hearing, 335 a factor not present in employment
termination cases. Although the Court acknowledged that dis-
charge could produce adversity, the hardship to the employee does
not depend on whether facts are contested or whether uncontested
facts might be explained. In either case, Loudermill requires only
that employees be given notice and an opportuity to explain their
story. If the employer persists in the discharge, explanations, facts,
and mitigation are litigated afterwards.
Although it offers public employees some protection, Loudermill
contains significant limitations. In the first place, the decision ap-
plies only to public employees who are tenured or have some legiti-
mate expectation of job security. At-will public employees have no
property interests in their jobs and, therefore, enjoy no due process
protections. In addition, the scope of the protection afforded ten-
ured employees is narrow. As noted, the employer need do little
more than listen to an employee's explanation of the facts.
Loudermill establishes no right to an evidentiary hearing, and impor-
tantly, no opportunity to confront an accuser. Furthermore, noth-
ing in the opinion purports to limit an employer's discretion even
after the "hearing," which is only a preliminary check on the reason-
ableness of the discharge. 36
Despite its limitations, Loudermill does work one significant
change in public employment law. No longer will public agencies be
able to argue that governmentally created rights can be limited at
will by restrictive enforcement procedures. The Court's decision on
that issue is unquestionably correct. As noted by Justice Rehnquist
in his dissenting opinion, the same Ohio statute granting tenure to
public employees also created procedures for its revocation.3
Since the tenure entitlement, therefore, was not intended by the
state to be absolute, Justice Rehnquist criticized the Court for
seiz[ing] upon one of several paragraphs in a unitary statute to
proclaim that in that paragraph the State has inexorably conferred
upon a civil service employee something which it is powerless under
334. Id. at 1495; see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
335. 397 U.S. at 264.
336. 105 S. Ct. at 1495.
337. Id. at 1503 (RehnquistJ., dissenting).
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the United States Constitution to qualify in the next paragraph of
the statute. ' '338  Rehnquist's charge grossly mischaracterizes the
Court's decision. The majority's opinion does not say, and cannot
be interpreted fairly to mean, that states cannot limit or qualify an
employee's job tenure. It merely holds that any procedural limita-
tion must not offend recognized due process guarantees. That is,
substantive rights need not be absolute, but they cannot be qualified
by unconstitutional procedures. In Loudermill, for example, the state
was free to discharge either employee for cause. Nothing in the
Court's opinion limits that right. It merely recognizes that govern-
mental units cannot deprive employees of property rights without
due process of law. In such cases "some kind of prior hearing is
paramount." 339
Loudermill also contains a warning for public employers who are
party to a collective bargaining agreement. Even if the employees
subject to the agreement do not have tenure under state law, the
contract itself may create a legitimate expectation of continued em-
ployment and, therefore, a constitutionally protected property
right.34 ° If the contract provides that discharge may be only for
338. Id.
339. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972).
340. In Roth, the Court said:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have . . . more
than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it.
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather,
they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or under-
standings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitle-
ment to those benefits.
Id. at 577.
There is little doubt that employment contracts can create a legitimate claim of enti-
tlement. Indeed, the commitment need not even be expressed. For example, in Roth
the Court read its decision in Connell v. Higgenbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971), to mean
that even those with only an "implied promise of continued employment" were safe-
guarded by the due process clause. 408 U.S. at 577. Similarly, in Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593 (1972), decided the same day as Roth, the Court remanded the case in
order to allow a discharged teacher to show that, notwithstanding the lack of formal
tenure, he nonetheless had a reasonable expectation of continued employment:
A written contract with an explicit tenure provision clearly is evidence of a for-
mal understanding that supports a teacher's claim of entitlement to continued
employment unless sufficient "cause" is shown. Yet absence of such an explicit
contractual provision may not always foreclose the possibility that a teacher has
a "property" interest in reemployment. For example, the law of contracts in
most, if not all, jurisdictions long has employed a process by which agreements
• . . may be "implied".
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proper cause, or if such a guarantee is even implicit in the docu-
ment,3 1 ' Loudermill would require notice and an opportunity to be
heard prior to the discharge. Since the grievance-arbitration provi-
sions of a typical contract would not become operative until after
the discharge, Loudermill would appear to mandate revisions calcu-
lated to provide a limited hearing before termination.
IV. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT AND RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),342  among other
things, 3 establishes minimum wage and overtime requirements for
employees who are engaged in commerce or who are employed by
an enterprise engaged in commerce. 344 The question recently con-
fronted by the Supreme Court in Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v.
Secretary of Labor,345 was whether the FLSA applies to workers em-
ployed in the commercial activities of a religious foundation.
The Alamo Foundation is a nonprofit religious organization3 46
that supports its activities by operating thirty-eight commercial ven-
tures, ranging from construction companies to hog farms. 347 The
businesses are staffed by approximately 300 "associates," described
by the Court as consisting mostly of former "drug addicts, derelicts
or criminals" who have been converted to the Foundation's reli-
gious beliefs.3 48 The Foundation does not pay the associates in
341. See Perry v. Sindermann, discussed at supra note 340. Arbitrators sometimes con-
clude that the mere existence of a collective bargaining agreement provides some form
of job security, regardless of whether the contract expressly requires proper cause for
discharge. See, e.g., Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Boston (1949) (Wallen, Arb.) (unre-
ported, but an edited version appears in A. Cox, D. BoK, & R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW
CASES AND MATERIALS 597-603 (8th ed. 1977)).
342. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
343. The statute also restricts the employment of child labor. 29 U.S.C. § 212.
344. The term "employee" is defined at 29 U.S.C. § 203(e). "Enterprise" is defined
by 29 U.S.C. § 203(r). "Enterprise engaged in commerce" is defined at 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(s). For a brief description of these jurisdictional requirements, see LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) at LRX 253-59 (Jun. 17, 1985).
345. 105 S. Ct. 1953 (1985).
346. The Foundation's purposes are to " 'establish, conduct and maintain an Evangel-
istic Church; to conduct religious services, to minister to the sick and needy, to care for
the fatherless and to rescue the fallen, and generally to do those things needful for the
promotion of Christian faith, virtue, and charity.' " 105 S. Ct. at 1957 (quoting the
Foundation's Articles of Incorporation).
347. Those businesses listed by the Court are "service stations, retail clothing and
grocery outlets, hog farms, roofing and electrical construction companies, a recordkeep-
ing company, a motel, and companies engaged in the production and distribution of
candy." Id. at 1957 & n. 2.
348. Id.
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cash, but furnishes them with room, board, clothing, transportation,
and medical care. 49
Although the associates did not consider themselves to be em-
ployees and did not seek the statute's protection 350 (one associate
testified that the idea of working for compensation was "vexing to
my soul" 351 ), the Secretary of Labor sued the Foundation, contend-
ing that the associates were employees for purposes of the Act. The
district court ignored the associates' claim that they were mere vol-
unteers. It found that they were "entirely dependent on the Foun-
dation" for the necessitites of life and that, under an economic
realities test, they received "wages in another form. ' 52
The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision, finding
both that the Foundation's commercial ventures were enterprises
engaged in commerce and that the associates were employees. The
Foundation had contended that its businesses were not "enter-
prises" because there was no "common business purpose. ' 353 The
Court, however, noted that it has traditionally interpreted the Act
"'liberally to apply to its furthest reaches,' -3" and that the statute
contains no exception for commercial ventures of religious founda-
tions or other nonprofit organizations.355 The fact that the Secre-
tary of Labor has "consistently interpreted the statute to reach such
businesses," the Court said, was also entitled to "considerable
weight. ' 3 56 Finally, the Court rejected the Foundation's claim that
any "business purpose" was negated because its commercial activi-
ties were "churches in disguise," both as vehicles for spreading the
349. Id.
350. Id. at 1958.
351. Id. at 1963 n. 27.
352. Id. at 1958. The statute defines "wage" as including "board, lodging or other
facilities." 29 U.S.C. § 203(m).
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision as to liability, but remanded
on the remedy issue. Donovan v. Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation, 722 F.2d 397
(1984). The district court ordered that all associates be advised of their opportunity to
submit a claim. 105 S. Ct. at 1958. The court of appeals held that the trial court should
have calculated the amount of back pay due. 722 F.2d at 404-405.
353. Id. at 1959. The Act defines "enterprise," in part, as "the related activities per-
formed. . . by any person or persons for a common business purpose." 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(r).
354. 105 S. Ct. at 1959 (quoting Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Assoc., 358 U.S.
207, 211 (1959)).
355. Id. See 29 U.S.C. §501(c)(3).
356. 105 S. Ct. at 1959-60. The Court quoted 29 C.F.R. § 779.214 (1984) which savs,
in part, that "[a]ctivities of eleemosynary, religious, or educational organizations may be
performed for a business purpose." The Court also found some support for its decision
in the legislative history. 105 S. Ct. at 1959-60.
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gospel and as a means of providing rehabilitation to the associates.
The Court simply characterized the Foundation's argument as a fac-
tual question that had been resolved against it by the lower
courts.357 Although the Court did not question the Foundation's
religious activities, it found that its businesses were commercial ven-
tures operating in competition with ordinary commercial enter-
prises. 35 8 The Court noted that "[i]t is exactly this kind of 'unfair
method of competition' that the Act was intended to prevent, '3 59
and concluded that "the admixture of religious motivations does
not alter a business's effect on commerce. ' 3 60
The Court then turned to the question of employee status. The
Foundation argued that its associates were volunteers who expected
no compensation for their efforts, an assertion supported by the tes-
timony of associates themselves. 36 1 Nevertheless, the Court applied
a test of "economic reality" and found the associates to be employ-
ees for purposes of the Act. Not only were the associates completely
dependent on the Foundation for the necessities of life, but they
expected to receive such benefits in exchange for their services.
The benefits, therefore, were "wages in another form." The Court
also observed that if the FLSA is interpreted to contain an exception
for those who work "voluntarily," employers might be able to use
their superior bargaining power to force workers outside the protec-
tion of the Act. The consequences would be felt not only by the
employees directly affected, but by other workers as well, since the
result would be "a general downward pressure on wages in compet-
ing businesses. ' 362 The Court concluded that there was little likeli-
hood that its decision would discourage genuine volunteers because
the Fair Labor Standards Act reaches only those who work in com-
mercial ventures with the expectation of compensation. 36 3
Finally, the Court rejected claims that FLSA coverage violated
the religion clauses of the first amendment. Clearly, the Court did
not perceive coverage under the Act to present a significant threat
to religious freedom. Its treatment of the issues was both mechani-
cal and brief. The Foundation contended that requiring the associ-
ates to accept wages in violation of their religious convictions
357. 105 S. Ct. at 1959-60.
358. Id. at 1960-6 1.
359. Id. at 1961.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 1962.
363. Id.
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interfered with their free exercise of religion. 3 1 The Court said,
however, that the associates were already receiving benefits in ex-
change for their services. Under the Act, such payments qualify as
wages. 36 5 Therefore, coverage would have little effect on the associ-
ates' freedom to worship. Moreover, if the Foundation were re-
quired to pay cash, "there is nothing in the Act to prevent the
associates from returning the amounts to the Foundation, provided
they do so voluntarily. ' ,"6 6 The Court also rejected the Founda-
tion's contention that the Act's recordkeeping requirements posed a
danger of excessive governmental entanglement, prohibited by the
establishment clause. The Court simply held that the recordkeeping
requirements were not excessive and posed little danger since they
applied only to the Foundation's commercial ventures, not its "ev-
angelical activities.
' 3 67
Even though Alamo extends coverage of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, the decision would not appear to have great practical ef-
fect. Employees who receive room, board, medical care, and similar
benefits are probably already paid more than the minimum wage, a
fact recognized by the Court in Alamo.3 68 Employees who work
more than forty hours a week, however, are entitled to overtime
3691nvecompensation. In view of the long hours reportedly worked by
some Alamo associates,3 7 1 the Foundation may be required to make
some wage payments in cash. It seems likely, however, that employ-
ees who are genuinely committed to the Foundation's religious mis-
sion will simply return the funds.
While the Court's decision seems clearly correct as applied to
the Alamo Foundation, it might raise an issue concerning the dis-
tinction between volunteers and employees. The Court's treatment
of the issue was almost cavalier. It merely asserted that coverage
extends only to those in commercial ventures who expect compen-
sation. The decision, the Court said, would not affect those "who
drive the elderly to church, serve church suppers, or help remodel a
church home for the needy."3 7 ' The Court, however, glossed over
364. Id. at 1963.
365. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(m).
366. 105 S. Ct. at 1963.
367. Id. at 1964.
368. Id. at 1963. Currently, the minimum wage is $3.35 per hour. 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(a)(1).
369. See 29 U.S.C. § 207.
370. Some former associates testified that they worked 10 to 15 hours a day, 6 or 7
days a week. 105 S. Ct. at 1962 n. 22.
371. Id. at 1962.
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the possibility that churches might expect volunteers to participate
in other forms of activity as well. It is not unusual, for example, for
churches to fund projects by holding bakesales, dinners, car washes
and a variety of other "commercial" activities. Even though not car-
ried on over long periods of time, such activities obviously compete,
at least to some extent, with "ordinary" commercial ventures like
bakeries and restaurants. One would think that a Saturday after-
noon car wash operated by a church youth group is not an "enter-
prise engaged in commerce" and that the workers, therefore, are
not "employees." They are not, however, "ministering to the com-
fort of the sick, elderly, indigent, infirm or handicapped.- 372
Rather, they are producing income in competition with commercial
ventures. It should not matter that the income will be used for reli-
gious or charitable purposes, since that fact was unavailing in Alamo.
Moreover, the fact that the members of the youth group expect no
compensation is hardly determinative; the associates in Alamo had
little expectations either.
Presumably, the Alamo associates were deemed employees be-
cause they depended on benefits from the Foundation for extended
periods of time, a fact almost certainly not present in the casual fun-
draising activities of some churches. Nevertheless, the Court's opin-
ion is unnecessarily superficial and may produce confusion, rather
than certainty, for religious organizations that fund programs by
selling products or services also available from ordinary commercial
outlets.
Conclusion
As noted at the outset, even though the Court has decided im-
portant cases, neither of the last two terms has provided any major
surprises. The Court continues to be charitable to labor arbitration
when doing so is compatible with a decision apparently reached on
other grounds. 373 Similarly, Sure-Tan, City Disposal and Action Auto-
motive indicate that the Court has kept intact its version of deference
372. These were activities listed by the Court as having been recognized as volunteer
work by the Secretary of Labor. Id.
373. Although the Allis-Chalmers decision was purportedly motivated by deference to
the arbitral forum, recent cases raise questions about the Court's continued commit-
ment to arbitration. See, e.g., City Disposal, supra notes 4-33 and accompanying text; Met-
ropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 103 S. Ct. 1467 (1983) (two arbitration decisions on
same subject not sufficient to establish contractual waiver of statutory right); Barrentine
v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (arbitration case no bar to
subsequent claim under Fair Labor Standards Act); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Sewer
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to administrative expertise, 74 a factor evident in Alamo as well.
The decisions do, however, produce some consternation. Sure-
Tan evidences insensitivity to the NLRB's dilemma of having to rem-
edy egregious unfair labor practices on the part of employers
through traditional measures. The same detachment is apparent in
the Loudermill opinion, which purports to protect due process rights,
while approving a procedure that is not likely to be of much signifi-
cance to public employees suffering discharge. By far the most
troublesome decision is Stotts. The Court's opinion is unnecessarily
vague and, for that reason, appears to jeopardize significant gains in
equal opportunity and affirmative action. One can only hope that
the Court will be more careful when it confronts the issue anew next
term.
Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (arbitration case no bar to subsequent Title VII claim concern-
ing same facts). But see W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Rubber Workers, 103 S. Ct. 2177
(1983).
374. It is not easy to predict when the Court will defer to the Board's interpretation of
the statute. As one commentator has observed, "All that can be said with confidence is
that courts tend to believe that their own competence matches that of the Board, and
finally surpasses it, as the finding moves from pure fact, to mixed questions, to issues of
pure statutory construction." R. GORMAN, supra note 22, at 13.
Deferential opinions like Action Automotive are not unusual. See, e.g., Charles D. Bon-
nano Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 419 (1982) ("The dissenting Justices
would have us substitute our judgment for those [sic] of the Board with respect to the
issues that Congress intended the Board should resolve. This we are unwilling to do.").
Other cases, however, refuse to accept NLRB interpretations. See, e.g., Edward J.
Debartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 103 S. Ct. 2926 (1983) (rejecting the Board's interpretation
that handbilling was protected by the publicity proviso to § 8(b)(4)(B)). See also NLRB v.
Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270, 278 (1973) (In reviewing the agency's decision, Justice
Douglas stated that "the Board's analysis ignores the realities of the situation.").
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